

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE  
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EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE  
SCHOLAR SUPPORT OFFICE



All-Ukrainian Scientific and Practical Conference

**«COUNTERACTING THE GENOCIDE OF UKRAINIANS»**

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G 54      Counteracting the Genocide of Ukrainians: Collection of Materials from the All-Ukrainian Scientific and Practical Conference «Counteracting the Genocide of Ukrainians» (Kyiv, May 8, 2025) [Electronic resource]. – Kyiv, 2025. – 102 p.

The Collection of Materials from the All-Ukrainian Scientific and Practical Conference “Counteracting the Genocide of Ukrainians” (Kyiv, May 8, 2025) provides a comprehensive analysis of urgent issues related to the genocide of the Ukrainian people committed by the Russian Federation. This 95-page publication covers a broad spectrum of topics, including the historical, legal, and socio-political dimensions of investigating the crimes of the aggressor.

The primary goal of the conference was to strengthen efforts to counter the ongoing genocide in Ukraine and to expedite the investigation and documentation of crimes committed by the Russian Federation. Participants discussed various mechanisms and strategies for resisting aggression, as well as opportunities for international cooperation in this field.

This collection serves as a valuable resource for practitioners and scholars, policymakers, and public figures committed to preserving historical truth and ensuring justice for the victims of genocide..

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# **HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE GENOCIDE OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE**

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## **EDUCATION AS A TOOL TO COUNTER GENOCIDE: THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL MEMORY OF THE HOLODOMOR.**

**Keywords:** historical memory, Holodomor, genocide, educational practices, national identity, collective trauma, postcolonial consciousness, memorialization.

**Introduction.** The tragic pages of the past, particularly the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine, require special attention within the educational discourse as examples of genocidal practices by totalitarian regimes. Education serves not only as a transmission mechanism for knowledge but also as a powerful tool for shaping collective consciousness capable of resisting manipulative narratives and recognizing the precursors of mass repression in a contemporary context.

The Holodomor, as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people aimed at destroying national identity and suppressing resistance to Soviet authority, remains insufficiently integrated into the global educational context. At the same time, the memorialization and critical reflection of this tragedy through educational practices lay the foundation for developing societal resilience against all forms of dehumanization and discrimination. A comprehensive coverage of the causes, course, and consequences of the Holodomor within educational programs constitutes an essential component in fostering historical justice and preventing the recurrence of genocidal practices [1].

The aim of this study is to analyze educational practices of Holodomor memorialization and assess their effectiveness in shaping historical memory as a tool for countering genocidal tendencies. The research seeks to explore the interconnection between preserving the memory of the Holodomor and fostering societal resilience to narratives of dehumanization.

**Results.** The conceptualization of genocide as a legal category emerged in the mid-20th century in response to crimes against humanity that were unprecedented in their scale and systematic nature. The term genocide was introduced in 1944 by Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin to denote a deliberate policy aimed at the destruction of specific national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. Etymologically, the concept combines the Greek word *genos* (clan, tribe) and the Latin *caedo* (to kill), emphasizing the annihilation of entire communities based on group identity [2].

The legal codification of the term genocide occurred with the adoption of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on December 9, 1948. Article II of the Convention defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” The key elements of this definition include: the specific intent (*dolus specialis*), targeting a protected group, and systematic actions. According to the Convention, acts of genocide include:

- (a) killing members of the group;
- (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group [3].

The legal interpretation of genocide has significantly evolved under the influence of the jurisprudence of international judicial institutions. A major development in the field was the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which clarified the constituent elements of the crime of genocide and the criteria for proving intent. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in 1998, reaffirmed the definition of genocide established by the 1948 Convention and included it among the most serious international crimes.

The history of the 20th and 21st centuries includes a number of tragic events that have been recognized internationally as acts of genocide. The Holocaust (1939–1945) serves as the paradigmatic example, shaping the modern understanding of genocide. The systematic extermination by the Nazi regime of Jews, Roma, and other groups resulted in the deaths of approximately six million Jews and hundreds of thousands of individuals from other communities. The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (1945–1946) held the Nazi leadership accountable for crimes against humanity, which were later categorized as genocide [4].

One of the most complex issues in international legal discourse is the qualification of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine as genocide. The man-made famine, orchestrated by the Stalinist regime, caused the deaths of an estimated 3.5 to 5 million Ukrainians and displayed characteristics of a deliberate policy aimed at undermining national identity and suppressing resistance to Soviet authority. The process of international recognition of the Holodomor as genocide has been gradual and inconsistent. As of 2024, the parliaments and governments of over 30 countries have officially recognized the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people.

Legal challenges in qualifying the Holodomor as genocide stem from several factors. First and foremost, the Genocide Convention was adopted after the events of 1932–1933, raising debates regarding the retroactive application of its provisions. Additionally, the political motivation of the regime—targeting the Ukrainian peasantry as the social base of the national movement—creates further complexities, as social groups are not among the protected categories listed in the Convention. At the same time, contemporary research convincingly demonstrates the presence of an ethno-national component in Soviet policy toward Ukraine, which allows for the interpretation of the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian nation.

Table 1.

Demographic Losses in Ukraine Due to the Holodomor of 1932–1933

Region of the Ukrainian SSR (as of 1932–1933)	Estimated Death Toll	Share of Region's Total Population (%)
Kyiv Region	890 000	20%
Kharkiv Region	790 000	22%
Poltava Region	600 000	24%
Dnipropetrovsk Region	510 000	18%
Chernihiv Region	350 000	17%
Vinnitsia Region	340 000	15%
Total for the Ukrainian SSR	~3 900 000	~15%

The evolution of approaches to presenting this tragic chapter of history in school education reflects broader processes of decolonizing the Ukrainian educational space and reinterpreting the Soviet past. An analysis of Ukrainian history curricula shows a gradual expansion and deepening of the thematic section dedicated to the Holodomor, which aligns with nationwide policies of memorialization and the establishment of a consensus narrative recognizing the genocidal nature

of this tragedy [5].

In modern curricula for general secondary education institutions, the topic of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 is presented across several educational stages, ensuring a spiral approach to the accumulation of knowledge and competencies in accordance with students' age characteristics. Initial acquaintance with the topic occurs within the integrated course «I Explore the World» for primary school students, where the focus is on emotionally accessible narratives and the development of empathy. Systematic study of the Holodomor begins in Grade 5 as part of the introductory course in Ukrainian history, where students become familiar with basic facts and the chronology of events.

The topic is covered most comprehensively in the Grade 10 Ukrainian history course, where it constitutes a separate thematic module. Analysis of curricula indicates a gradual transition from a fact-based approach to a competency-based one, aimed at fostering critical thinking and civic responsibility.

An important component of educational and methodological support includes specialized manuals developed by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences, and civil society organizations. In particular, the methodological guidelines titled «The Holodomor of 1932–1933 – The Genocide of the Ukrainian People,» designed for history teachers, provide documentary materials, didactic frameworks, and recommendations for conducting memory lessons [6].

Higher education plays a crucial role in shaping the scholarly discourse on the Holodomor and in training specialists capable of integrating this issue into educational and commemorative practices. An analysis of higher education institutions' curricula reveals a variety of approaches to including the topic of the Holodomor in the educational process, which is influenced by the specific nature of different academic disciplines and the autonomy of universities in developing their programs.

Introductory engagement with the topic generally occurs within the core course “History of Ukraine,” required for all majors, where the Holodomor is studied in the context of Soviet policy toward Ukraine. At the same time, the depth and methodological sophistication of how the topic is covered depends on the academic focus of the institution and the conceptual perspectives of individual instructors. A comparative analysis of syllabi highlights differences in emphasis across programs, ranging from socio-economic causes and demographic consequences to political-legal qualification and memorial practices.

For students of history faculties, the topic of the Holodomor is incorporated into specialized courses on the history of Ukraine in the 20th century, the history of totalitarianism, demographic history, and historical trauma studies. A distinctive feature of university education is the opportunity for in-depth study of source material, historiography, and theoretical and methodological approaches to researching the Holodomor. An essential component in training future historians is the mastery of archival heuristics, source criticism, and the interpretation of statistical data, which forms the foundation for professional research in this field.

Conclusions. The analysis of educational practices related to the memorialization of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 demonstrates a gradual transformation in approaches to presenting this tragedy in educational discourse—from a fact-based to a competence-oriented model. The spiral structure of curricula and the availability of specialized teaching and methodological materials provide a foundation for the systematic development of historical memory and national identity, despite the legal challenges associated with the international classification of the Holodomor as genocide.

Prospects for Further Research. Promising directions for further research include studying the effectiveness of various pedagogical methods for shaping memory about the Holodomor, conducting a comparative analysis of memorialization educational practices in Ukraine and other countries, exploring the potential of digital technologies in teaching this topic, as well as developing methods for assessing the impact of memorialization educational practices on the formation of civic competencies in youth.



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## **RUSSIAN POLICY OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY DESTRUCTION IN THE 19th – FIRST HALF OF THE 20th CENTURY AS A MANIFESTATION OF THE UKRAINIAN NATION GENOCIDE**

**Keywords:** national identity, ethnic Ukrainians, genocide, annexation, repression, deportations.

For almost four and a half centuries, Russia, using various levers (political, military, economic, cultural and spiritual), has been trying to destroy the national identity of Ukrainians in every way, not only by occupying the territory of our state, but also by means of eliminating the elite layer of Ukrainian society, destroying the national Ukrainian culture, imposing alien archetypes that are not inherent in the consciousness of the Ukrainian population.

The Russian-Ukrainian war, which began on February 24, 2022, became a kind of litmus test that exposed all the hidden aspirations of the aggressor state, which it nurtured during the thirty-year period of the Ukrainian independence history. Initially, using the methodology of hybrid warfare, and later, fueling the separatist sentiments of the marginal part of Ukrainian society, Russia annexed Crimea, and also provoked an undeclared war in the East in 2014, purposefully preparing for a further full-scale invasion, which was implemented in 2022. It is worth noting that during the three years of the war, numerous facts of genocide of both the civilian population and military personnel were exposed, which was accompanied by the destruction of spiritual and cultural values and manifestations of the natural resources destruction (ecocide). That is why, we consider it necessary to investigate the historical origins of the Russian policy aimed at the destruction of Ukrainian national identity, which was extremely actively carried out in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, which is simply necessary for the formation of a holistic picture that reflects the history of the Ukrainian nation genocide. Therefore, the topic we have chosen is relevant and requires further scientific research.

The purpose of the work is to study Russia's policy aimed at the Ukrainian national identity destruction in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries as a manifestation of the Ukrainian nation genocide.

It is worth mentioning that the policy aimed at destroying any manifestations of Ukrainian national identity has a significant protohistory, which begins in the second half of the 17th century with the conclusion of the Pereyaslav Treaty and the March Articles by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Since then, at first slowly, and then more and more actively, first the Moscow Kingdom, and then the Russian Empire, led by Peter I, begin an offensive not only on Ukrainian territory, but also on the economy, cultural and spiritual component, national history and memory. During this period, as a result of powerful manipulations, an ideology that the Russian Empire was the heir to the Russian state was laid in the minds of the population.

The process of destroying Ukrainian national identity especially actively began in the 19th and early 20th centuries. A distinctive feature of this period was the doubling of the Russian aggressor's efforts, who combined his political-territorial aspirations and cultural-spiritual component for a single goal – to destroy in the minds of more than eight million Ukrainians, who as a result of the three partitions of Poland lived on the territory belonging to the Russian Empire, any manifestations of national identity and transform them into a completely controlled

mass, which the imperialists contemptuously called ‘malorosy’ (Little Russians). And although the 19th century was marked by events that were quite significant for Ukrainian history, which are now known as ‘national revival’, we should not forget the reactionary offensive of the Russian leadership on the territory and population of Ukraine: prohibition of any public organizations that were of a national character (communities), total russification, which was combined with the publication of Ukrainian books and was supported by such regulatory and legislative acts as the Valuev Circular of 1863 and the Ems Decree of 1872, forbiddance for children whose parents were from the third estate to receive education (the circular on the cook’s children of 1887) – an incomplete list of actions of the Russian leaders aimed at destroying any manifestations of Ukrainianness.

The Russians paid special attention to the south of Ukraine, where since the reign of Catherine II the project ‘Novorossiiia’ had been implemented, the goal of which was to populate this territory exclusively with the Russian-speaking population and representatives of various ethnic groups, who were to displace Ukrainians and everything Ukrainian from the Black Sea and Azov regions. Later, the idea that the southern Ukrainian territories were exclusively Russian lands, where Russians had originally lived, began to emerge. As for the Ukrainian population, they simply began to be deported to the Caucasus and Siberia. This process was especially accelerated at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, when, according to Volodymyr Butkevych, 1,690,000 Ukrainians were deported to Siberia in 1896–1914 alone [1], while Russians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Germans, Jews, Moldovans, etc. were settled in their place.

Despite such radical steps, according to scientific research by historians such as F. Turchenko, G. Turchenko, O. Gava and others, exclusively the Ukrainian-speaking population played the main role in the settlement of these territories. Their opinion is confirmed by the results of the first census, according to which the share of Ukrainians in the southern Ukrainian lands was 70–85% [2], while the share of the Russian population did not exceed 5%.

Another vector of the aggressive policy of the Russian Empire was the conquest of the Crimean Khanate in 1783 and the accession to the territorial possessions according to the peace treaty of the Crimean peninsula. According to the research of L. Zaliznyak, the Ukrainian-speaking population prevailed among all ethnic groups that inhabited these lands since the 17th century [3, 78], but they lived mainly in rural areas, since in conducting the economy they were primarily oriented towards ancient agricultural traditions. While the cities were urbanized by the Russians, the traditional orientation of Ukrainians to agriculture, according to Fedor and Halyna Turchenko, led to their slow inclusion in industry and trade, which were rapidly developing in these territories as a result of the industrial revolution of the 19th century [4, 46].

That is why the Ukrainian-speaking population was associated in the minds of other ethnic groups exclusively with the village. However, at the beginning of the 20th century, the modernization processes that affected the economy of the Russian Empire also had a positive impact on the southern Ukrainian lands. The mass urbanization of the south and east of Ukraine led to the fact that the vast majority of the Ukrainian-speaking population left the countryside and moved to cities: therefore, according to the statistical data compiled by Ivan Terlyuk, every second inhabitant of these territories was ethnically Ukrainian, and only every fifth was Russian [5, 320]. Therefore, we can argue that despite the intensification of the policy of destroying Ukrainian national identity, the Russian Empire suffered defeat, as evidenced by the unsuccessful implementation of many political projects at the first stage, in particular, the project ‘Novorossiya’.

The 20th century entered the history of our country as one of the most dramatic periods. The First World War, which divided the Ukrainian population into two hostile camps, in which they were forced to fight among themselves for the imperial interests of two antagonistic military blocs, and the defeat of the Ukrainian National Liberation Struggle of 1917–1921, ultimately led to Ukraine’s almost 70-year stay as part of a new, totalitarian state in its essence – the Soviet Union.

After a desperate four-year struggle for independence, which ended in defeat, in 1920 a union treaty was formally drawn up between the Ukrainian SSR and the Russian SFSR, and in 1922

the USSR was created, into which Ukraine entered as a formally equal federal state, with clearly defined borders, its own administrative and territorial division, and a constitution. However, the signs of state sovereignty existed only on paper; in reality, the aggressor state did not plan to adhere to any equality from the very beginning. On the contrary, it quickly became obvious to the union republics that the percentage of their independence was almost zero.

To tame the population, which initially felt the spirit of freedom, the Soviet party leadership applied draconian political and economic measures, trying not only to erase the desire for independence from the consciousness of the population, but also to erase any manifestations of national identity in general, effectively drowning all Ukrainian aspirations in blood. Three famines, one of which (the Holodomor of 1932–1933) was officially recognized as genocide by 32 international states, constant repressions and mass deportations – such was the Ukrainian reality of the first half of the twentieth century. All these inhuman measures were carried out with a single goal – to turn every Ukrainian into a submissive subject, devoid of any national manifestations, and his transformation into a typical 'gray mass' of people, which was called Soviet society.

This policy of the Soviet leadership led to significant losses of the ethnic Ukrainian population. Thus, during the years of three famines, according to estimates by both domestic and foreign scientists, more than 14 million people died. And as a result of mass deportations, our state lost more than 750 thousand ethnic Ukrainians and 200 thousand ethnic Tatars [6]. The policy aimed at the Ukrainian population destruction, the total Russification of the political, educational and cultural spheres of life in the Ukrainian SSR took deep roots in the process of national self-affirmation, which resulted in the following fact – at the beginning of the 1990s, the number of the population that identified itself as Russians by national indicator fluctuated at the level of 59% [7, 120], which ultimately became a direct threat to the process of self-identification with Ukrainians and in the future led to the growth of separatist sentiments among this category of the population.

Thus, we can conclude that Russia's policy in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, regardless of the form of state formation, was: whether the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union had only one goal – to erase the national identity of the Ukrainian population by any means. On the way to achieving its goal, the aggressor state spared no effort, turning its political decisions into genocide of the Ukrainian population.

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## **FROM THE HOLODOMOR-GENOCIDE OF 1932–1933 TO THE GENOCIDE OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE: SIMPLIFICATION OF RUSSIAN MYTHS, FAKES AND FALSIFICATIONS OF THE HISTORY OF UKRAINE**

**Keywords:** Ukraine, Ukrainians, Holodomor-genocide of 1932–1933, genocide of the Ukrainian people, Russian-Ukrainian war, rashism, Russian myths, fakes, falsifications of the history of Ukraine.

**Introduction.** The Russian-Ukrainian war, which began on February 20, 2014 as a hybrid military conflict of low-intensity combat, turned into a full-scale war on February 24, 2022, involving millions of soldiers, hundreds of thousands of military equipment, and even short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, becoming a huge test for Ukraine and Ukrainians. The aggressor country seeks to finally resolve the so-called «Ukrainian question» - to eliminate the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian political nation, destroy the Ukrainian national identity, and turn Ukrainians into slaves and assimilate them. Scientists classify such actions as genocide. Almost 90 years ago, such actions were carried out against Ukraine and Ukrainians by a totalitarian communist regime. These criminal acts entered the historical annals as the Holodomor genocide of 1932–1933. The current Putin regime is trying to falsify the history of Ukraine and calls this tragedy a temporary food shortage caused by famine caused by weather anomalies. This substitution of concepts is systemic for the Rashists. Thus, V. Putin, in his televised address on February 24, 2022, «urbi et orbi», called the reasons for the so-called “special military operation” the “denazification and demilitarization” of Ukraine, without bothering with other convincing justifications.

**Purpose.** The main goal of the study is a comprehensive analysis of the underlying causes and consequences of the genocide of the Ukrainian people, from the Holodomor-genocide of 1932–1933 to understanding the terrible tragedy of the Russian-Ukrainian war and refuting Russian myths, fakes, and falsifications of the history of Ukraine.

**Results.** Ukraine and Ukrainians are an important factor in the geopolitics, geostrategy, and geoeconomics of the world. It was the military-political union of the Ukrainian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the Moscow Tsar Alexei Romanov that significantly weakened the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and greatly strengthened Muscovy, which ultimately led to the liquidation of the Polish-Lithuanian state and the transformation of the Moscow kingdom into the powerful Russian Empire. For centuries, Ukraine and Ukrainians were an important resource for the extensive and intensive development of the empire, and it seemed that after some time the Ukrainian people would be completely assimilated by the «great Russian people,» and the name «Ukraine» would finally disappear from the map of civilization. However, the First World War changed everything. The two empires in which Ukrainians lived, namely the Russian and Austro-Hungarian, collapsed, and the Ukrainian people were given the opportunity to restore statehood. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic were defeated by Bolshevik Russia and the Polish Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, even in these conditions, Ukrainians continued to resist the invaders. It was at this time that the famine of 1921-1923 began. The leadership of Bolshevik Russia successfully used the

terror of famine to finally eliminate the insurgent movement in Ukraine.

Researcher S. Kulchytsky emphasized that in 1921, Moscow first introduced terror through famine in Ukraine in order to suppress the insurgent movement caused by the confiscation of food by the Bolsheviks [Kulchytsky, 2023, p. 7].

The 1920s were an important era for the ethnocultural development of Ukraine and Ukrainians, primarily in terms of Ukrainization, the development of the Ukrainian language, literature, culture, etc. But, having strengthened its position in society, the totalitarian government intensified the processes of transforming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as the USSR) from an agrarian-industrial to an industrial-agrarian state in order to militarize the country as quickly as possible and take over Eurasia, and eventually the entire world. For this purpose, the so-called «five-year plan» was adopted - a five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR in 1928–1932. To accelerate industrialization, a lot of finance was needed, and to obtain it, the totalitarian government decided to implement collectivization to unite individual peasant households into large socialist production plants - collective farms - in order to obtain more commodity food and export it.

Ukrainian peasants did not want to become communist serfs and began to sabotage Moscow's plans. In turn, the metropolis increased the task of grain procurement and, as in 1921-1923, again used terror through famine against Ukrainians. As a result of these crimes, millions of Ukrainians died and were not born. S. Kulchytsky is convinced that the causes of the famines of 1921-1923 and 1932-1933 were different, but a terrorist component is clearly visible in them, since the totalitarian government in both cases mercilessly destroyed the peasants who were in conflict with it in order to force those who remained alive to reconcile with the demands of the government. Thus, the terror of hunger was convincing evidence of its genocidal nature [Kulchytsky, 2023, p. 5].

V. Borysenko notes that the most terrible and cruel Holodomor of 1932-1933 was cynically hushed up by Moscow, because it was a mass political repression against the Ukrainian ethnic group, a real genocide, which, due to its terrible essence, could not leave the world indifferent, since there was bread in Ukraine at that time, it was exported and even destroyed in order to starve the Ukrainian people [Borysenko, 2007, p. 54].

Yes, in 1932-1933 the communist regime broke the resistance of the Ukrainians, but already in 1941, during World War II, the Ukrainian people showed their attitude towards the Soviet government. Only the help of the Allies, primarily the United States of America and Great Britain, saved Moscow from surrender. But the laws of history are inevitable – after half a century, the USSR self-liquidated, and Ukrainians restored statehood.

Only after getting rid of the totalitarian dictate were Ukrainian researchers able to study the causes and consequences of the Holodomor genocide of 1932-1933. Thanks to these studies, on November 30, 2006, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine officially approved the Law of Ukraine No. 376-V “On the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine”, which, in particular, states: “Article 1. The Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine is a genocide of the Ukrainian people. Article 2. Public denial of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine is recognized as an insult to the memory of millions of Holodomor victims, a humiliation of the dignity of the Ukrainian people, and is unlawful. Article 3. State authorities and local self-government bodies, in accordance with their powers, are obliged to: participate in the formation and implementation of state policy in the field of restoring and preserving the national memory of the Ukrainian people; promote the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness and culture, the dissemination of information about the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine among the citizens of Ukraine and the world community, ensure the study of the Holodomor tragedy in educational institutions of Ukraine; take measures to perpetuate the memory of the victims and victims of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, including the construction of memorials in settlements and the installation of memorial signs to the victims of the Holodomor; ensure, in accordance with the established procedure, access for scientific and public institutions and organizations, scientists, and individual citizens who study the problems of the Holodomor of

1932-1933 in Ukraine and its consequences, to archival and other materials on issues related to the Holodomor [Zakon Ukrainy...].

Also an important step towards awareness of the problem of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 as a genocide in Ukraine and beyond was the ruling of the Kyiv City Court of Appeal of January 13, 2010, stating that the organizers of the Holodomor sought to eliminate the Ukrainian nation [Postanova apeliatsiinoho sudu mista ...].

Many in the civilized world rejoiced at the disintegration of the «evil empire». American scientist Francis Fukuyama even published the scientific work «The End of History», but the new leader of Russia, Vladimir Putin, did not think so. He publicly announced that the liquidation of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century and began the process of its restoration. However, without Ukraine and Ukrainians, this neo-imperial project was impossible.

Initially, V. Putin tried to take over Ukraine and Ukrainians with the help of the so-called «soft power» of the «Russian world», but he failed, as he had previously succeeded with Belarus and Belarusians.

According to Y. Figurny, the “Russian World” is not an ordinary cultural project, “de jure” aimed at preserving and developing the Russian language and culture, both in the Russian Federation itself and in the countries of the so-called “near abroad” (former Soviet republics) and “far abroad” (around the world), but “de facto”, a neo-imperial geopolitical ideological doctrine aimed at the theoretical substantiation and practical restoration of the “great historical Russia” within the borders of the Russian Empire at the peak of its power in 1914. [Figurny, 2021, p. 75].

The Ukrainian national revolution of the early 21st century was a response to the imperialist power of V. Putin. But, taking advantage of the temporary weakness of the revolutionary government, Russia launched armed aggression against Ukraine and Ukrainians, seizing and annexing Crimea, and initiating hostilities in eastern Ukraine. These aggressive actions by Moscow were intended to force Kyiv to abandon its Euro-Atlantic course and become a pro-Russian satellite, in order to later restore the «great historical Russia» dreamed of by Putin. Ukraine and Ukrainians once again thwarted V. Putin’s plans, so on February 24, 2022, he initiated the invasion of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, rejecting any cover. If the first stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war was characterized by hybridity (a combination of covert and overt means of struggle), then the second was full-scale (an attack by Russian troops from the north, east, and south and the involvement of almost all of Russia’s military potential in combat operations, with the exception of nuclear submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles). Thanks to the heroism of the citizens of the Ukrainian state, the racist blitzkrieg failed, so V. Putin decided to wage a war of attrition. In order to finally defeat Ukraine and Ukrainians, the genocide of the Ukrainian people was initiated.

Timothy Snyder identified six main signs of the genocide of the Ukrainian people, which are being carried out by racists on the orders of V. Putin. In particular, this is V. Putin’s denial of the existence of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people, the dehumanization of the Ukrainian people and permission for the Russian military to destroy Ukrainian cities and villages with their population, the denial by the Russian leadership of the Holodomor-genocide of 1932-1933, attempts to replace the Ukrainian population with Russians, and accusations of Ukrainians of fascism in order to carry out the so-called «denazification» [Timoti Snaider vyznachyv 6 oznak henotsydu...].

Arsen Zinchenko emphasizes that the modern world has understood the essence of Putin’s Russia, which, by blackmailing the world with the use of nuclear weapons and blocking the export of Ukrainian bread from Black Sea ports, aims to create the threat of new famines for many peoples who need Ukrainian grain. The manipulation of hunger to establish domination over peoples and its Russian political dictate in the world directly resembles the use of hunger as a political tool by terror not only to subjugate Ukraine and Ukrainians, but to destabilize European countries, as planned by Joseph Stalin, and these means are currently being used by the newest Fuhrer, Vladimir Putin [Zinchenko, 2023, p. 76].

Conclusions. We have analyzed the main causes and consequences of the genocide of the

Ukrainian people, which was carried out first by Stalin's USSR, and now by Putin's Russia. Firstly, for the totalitarian Soviet government, the terror of famine against Ukraine and Ukrainians became an effective means of achieving its goal – to transform the USSR into a super-powerful industrial-agrarian state in order to militarize the country as quickly as possible and take over the whole world. Secondly, the Holodomor-genocide of 1932–1933, which led to millions of victims of the Ukrainian people, was a consequence of this terrible policy. Thirdly, for the authoritarian Russian government, the genocide of the Ukrainian people during the Russian-Ukrainian war serves to eliminate the Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian political nation, destroy the Ukrainian national identity, and return Russia to the status of a superpower. Fourth, refuting Russian myths, fakes, and falsifications of Ukrainian history will help us understand the terrible tragedy of the Russian-Ukrainian war and consolidate the citizens of the Ukrainian state for victory over rashism.

Prospects for further research. Further research into the causes and consequences of the Holodomor-genocide of 1932–1933 and the modern genocide of the Ukrainian people, initiated by V. Putin during the Russian-Ukrainian war, will help to properly classify the Kremlin's systematic and complex genocidal acts against the Ukrainian people and contribute to the international recognition of the actions of Putin's Russia against Ukraine and Ukrainians as genocide of the Ukrainian people.

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## **THE KHOLODNOYARSKY PHENOMENON AS A FORM OF COUNTERACTION TO THE GENOCIDE OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE IN 1918-1922: HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE AND CURRENT CHALLENGES**

The work aims to reveal the essence of the Kholodnoyar movement as a national resistance, to identify its role in countering the destruction of Ukrainians, and to formulate lessons important for modern Ukrainian society in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

How often do we step on the same rake to learn the lesson that gives life to the existence of a nation?

Do we have such experience? How many times do we repeat our mistakes before we draw conclusions?

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war has intensified the issue of building Ukrainian national resilience and organizing a resistance movement against the Russian occupiers. The new version of the Russian Federation's totalitarian ideology, "rashism," aims to erase Ukrainian identity, culture, and centuries-old history, to destroy the Ukrainian nation, while distorting historical events and facts. The current war, in particular Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has demonstrated the exceptional relevance of rethinking ethnic and national values in Ukraine. Let us take a brief retrospective of a century ago.

The period of 1918-1922 in the history of Ukraine was marked by complex transformation processes accompanied by armed aggression, political repression, and attempts to destroy national identity. In this context, the so-called Kholodnoyarsk phenomenon is of particular importance, as it emerges as a unique form of popular self-organization and resistance to Bolshevik terror, which has all the hallmarks of genocide.

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Ukraine got a chance to restore its statehood. At the same time, a period of fierce struggle for power began, in which Bolshevik forces played a key role, seeking to incorporate Ukrainian lands into Soviet Russia. This process was accompanied by:

the merciless physical extermination and executions of Ukrainians who "disagreed" with the "new government"

the fight against "kulaks" and "bandits";

mass repression of the Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia;

systematic destruction of religious institutions;

forcible confiscation of food (prodrozverstka), creation of artificial famine;

the struggle against the Ukrainian language and culture.

Taken together, these actions meet the definition of genocide as attempts to physically and spiritually destroy a national community.

The Kholodnoyar movement was formed in the Cherkasy region, with its center in the Motronynsky Monastery, which brought together local residents, World War I veterans, and participants in the liberation struggle. Its ideological basis was the idea of restoring an independent Ukrainian People's Republic.

The Bolshevik authorities, trying to suppress the national movement, resorted to discrediting its participants. They were accused of banditry, robbery, and other crimes, presenting them as ordinary criminals hiding behind patriotic slogans. The term "Petliura banditry" was used especially actively to emphasize the connection between

the movement's members and the leader of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Symon Petliura, who was also declared an enemy of the people.

However, in reality, the accusations of "Petliura banditry" were groundless. The participants of the Kholodnoyarsk movement, although they resorted to armed struggle, were not bandits. They fought for their national ideals, for Ukraine's freedom from Bolshevik rule.

The use of the stamp "Petliura banditry" was one of the methods of Bolshevik propaganda aimed at destroying the national liberation movement in Ukraine. However, despite all the efforts of the authorities, the Kholodnoyarsk movement became an important stage in the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their independence.

The organizational structure of the movement was based on a military-administrative division with a clear hierarchy of commanders (atamans). Among the key figures were Vasyl Chuchupaka, Ivan Derkach, Omelyan Volokh, Hnat Pohylevych, and others. The territory of influence covered more than 15 thousand insurgents operating in a large part of the Right Bank of Ukraine.

The Kholodnoyarsky movement had a clearly expressed national liberation character and was a response to Bolshevik terror. The main forms of resistance were:

- open clashes and guerrilla warfare with enemy troops, such as the German occupiers, White Guards, and Red Army;

- interference with the operation of enterprises, transportation, and disruption of supplies to the enemy;

- ambushes, sabotage, surprise attacks on enemy columns and small units;

- collecting information about the enemy, destroying communications, bridges, warehouses, etc;

- protecting communities from food requisitions and Cheka terror;

- mobilization of peasants for armed resistance;

- disseminating patriotic instructions, calls to fight, organizing rallies and meetings, spreading and preserving national culture.

The Kholodnoyarsk insurgents used the following methods of action:

- rapid movement, using knowledge of the area for sudden attacks and retreats;

- using forests, ravines and other natural shelters for unexpected attacks;

- receiving support, assistance, food, and information from local residents.

- killing and abducting Soviet officials, commanders, and Cheka agents.

The rebels not only physically resisted Bolshevik repression, but also defended the foundations of the Ukrainian nation: language, traditions, and religion.

Given the nature of Soviet policy in the occupied territories, the actions of the Kholodnoyarsk organization can be interpreted as active opposition to genocide, which was realized through the forced subjugation and destruction of the Ukrainian national community. It was a peculiar example of localized defensive democracy that emerged in the context of the complete disintegration of the central government.

The content of Kholodnyi Yar's activities went beyond the scope of an ordinary insurgency and acquired a moral and ethical dimension, which testifies to the conscious choice of the local population in favor of independence, freedom, and self-determination.

Despite the heroism and dedication of the insurgents, the movement was defeated in 1923 due to lack of centralized leadership at the all-Ukrainian level; the superiority of the Bolshevik army in resources and numbers; ideological dispersion of some insurgent cells; insufficient international support for the Ukrainian struggle.

However, the Kholodnoyarsk phenomenon was not a defeat in the ideological sense; it became a symbol of resistance, national identity, and dignity. It is an example of how you can hold on even when it seems that everything is lost. It is proof that Ukrainians have always fought and will always fight for freedom.

The Kholodnoyarsk resistance was not just a military struggle - it was a form of

defense against genocide. In the literal sense. When the government destroys not only physically but also spiritually, the people have the right and even the duty to resist armed resistance. The people of Kholodnoyarsk did exactly that.

They defended not only their land, but also their language, faith, and dignity. They became the last bastion of Ukraine between the empire and oblivion.

The history of the Kholodnyi Yar resistance contains a number of relevant conclusions: maintaining the unity of the nation and preserving sovereignty are key factors in national survival;

distrust of the aggressor and awareness of the nature of hybrid forms of occupation are relevant in the context of modern warfare;

investing in national culture, language, and historical memory is a guarantee of the internal stability of society;

the need for a strong, mobilized army and strategic thinking at the level of public administration.

The Kholodny Yar phenomenon is not only a historical phenomenon, but also a valuable practical experience of the Ukrainian people's struggle for the right to exist. At a time when Ukraine is once again forced to defend its independence, studying the experience of Kholodny Yar is becoming especially relevant. Awareness of past mistakes and achievements allows us to avoid repeating historical tragedies and build a modern state on the basis of firm, proven principles.

So how can we avoid falling into the same old traps today? It would seem that we live in a different time. But unfortunately, the challenges are only getting more complicated. The history of Kholodny Yar teaches us that:

unity is above all. All internal strife weakens a nation. Our strength is only in unity;

do not trust the aggressor. The Bolsheviks came with slogans of "freedom" but brought death. Today, we see again how the "Russian world" comes with tanks, not peace;

building up our own army and security. Only a strong state can protect its citizens;

the national idea should be the core of the state. If the people do not know who they are, they are destroyed. Culture, language, and memory are also a frontline;

no one will protect us if we do not protect ourselves;

historical memory is not for museums, but for decisions. We must learn from our mistakes, not repeat them, and never step on the "old rake" again.

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## **CULTURAL GENOCIDE BY RUSSIA OF THE LIBRARY NETWORK OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE**

**Keywords:** academic libraries, cultural genocide, scientific genocide, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, V. I. Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine.

**Introduction.** The cultural and scientific genocide that the Russian Federation has been carrying out in Ukraine for over ten years is viewed by us as systemic steps towards the destruction of the national culture, science, and identity of Ukrainians. Forms of such genocide include the appropriation, destruction, or even elimination of cultural heritage and historical memory, the persecution of pro-Ukrainian citizens, the introduction of a system of education, science, and culture in the temporarily occupied territories according to the standards of the aggressor country, and the deliberate separation (segregation) of residents of the occupied territories from the information space of Ukraine.

Ukraine in the 21st century faced an unprecedented denial by another country of its right to its own history and identity. It is important, in addition to the political recognition of Russia's large-scale genocide in Ukraine, to also recognize cultural genocide, which is extremely necessary for the formation of a conscious nation in the future. For this, it is necessary to record all crimes committed in order to develop a clear position of the state on the protection of national interests and punishment of the aggressor.

In modern scientific discourse, the issue of cultural genocide is considered within the framework of the policy of colonial countries towards Aboriginal people, in particular Canada, the USA, Australia, France, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, etc. Researchers emphasize the need to strengthen international protection to counter cultural genocide, in particular in the analysis of the historical past of enslaved peoples, the destruction of their culture and cultural heritage in armed conflicts.

In Ukrainian science, the issue of the destruction of culture and cultural heritage in European armed conflicts is addressed in the publications of L. Prokopenko. Based on the experience of librarians during the siege of Sarajevo in 1992–1996, the researcher outlined the social role and value of the library in supporting society in wartime conditions [1]. V. Bakalchuk, in accordance with Raphael Lemkin's concept of cultural genocide, analyzed the acts of destruction of Ukrainian culture and identity by Russia [2]. The researcher identified the stages of the implementation of acts of cultural genocide by Russia in Ukraine, which she considered as systemic steps to destroy the Ukrainian nation.

The purpose of the publication is to highlight the issue of cultural genocide, which Russia has been committing on the territory of our country since 2014, using the example of the library network of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of Ukraine.

**Results.** The modern network of libraries of the NAS of Ukraine is represented by the V. I. Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine (VNLU), the V. Stefanyk Lviv National Scientific Library of Ukraine (V. Stefanyk LNSL of Ukraine), 95 libraries and library and information units, which consist of: Section of Physical, Technical and Mathematical Sciences of the NAS of

Ukraine – 44, Section of Chemical and Biological Sciences of the NAS of Ukraine – 27, Section of Social Sciences and Humanities of the NAS of Ukraine – 24. It is headed by two national-level library and information institutions: the V. I. Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine and the V. Stefanyk Lviv National Library of Ukraine. VNLU is a methodological center for all libraries of the NAS of Ukraine, the V. Stefanyk LNSL of Ukraine is for the libraries of the Western Scientific Center of the NAS of Ukraine and the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine [3, p. 145]. The oldest libraries in the network are: the Odessa Archaeological Museum of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (founded in 1825), the State Natural History Museum of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Lviv) (1870), the O. V. Bogatskyi Institute of Physics and Chemistry of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Odessa) (1911), and 33 academic libraries founded in the 1920s–1940s.

The network of libraries of the NAS of Ukraine, according to the Regulations, is a set of scientific libraries and information and library departments of scientific institutions, interconnected by purpose, composition of users and policy of acquiring scientific literature and regulatory and technical documentation on all types of information carriers, which should reflect the development of science in Ukraine and abroad and create unified distributed and interoperable information and library resources of the NAS of Ukraine [4].

Academic libraries play an important role in providing information for scientific research. After all, it is in their collections that all Ukrainian publications in the relevant field and the most complete and weighty foreign documents are collected. It is the libraries that have carefully formed the information support for scientific research for years, creating powerful arrays of specialized and related literature.

From the very beginning of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine and the establishment of control over the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the spring of 2014, the library network of the NAS of Ukraine suffered its first significant losses - five libraries of scientific institutions remained in the temporarily annexed territory, in particular the Marine Hydrophysical Institute of the NAS of Ukraine and its Experimental Department, of the O. O. Kovalevskyi Institute of Southern Sea Biology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Karadaz Nature Reserve of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and the Crimean branch of the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. We emphasize that it was at this stage that the “soft” power of Russian foreign policy turned into the violent imposition of its own culture, which was accompanied by large-scale measures to destroy and plunder Ukrainian monuments, library collections, archives, museums, art galleries, etc.

It should be noted that these libraries have collected valuable collections of narrowly specialized literature, carried out international cooperation, and exchanged professional information. For example, the library of the O. O. Kovalevskyi Institute of Southern Sea Biology of the NAS of Ukraine successfully cooperated in the international working group of experts on marine information management at the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, and the head of this book collection was elected to this commission in 2012. In 2013, training was conducted and consultations were provided to the libraries of the network on expanding international cooperation.

In the same year, 2014, Russia occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Five more libraries of the network were located in the temporarily occupied territory of Donetsk: the Donetsk Botanical Garden of the NAS of Ukraine, the O. O. Galkin Institute of Physics and Technology of the NAS of Ukraine, the Institute of Industrial Economics of the NAS of Ukraine, the Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics of the NAS of Ukraine, and the L. M. Lytvynenko Institute of Physical and Organic Chemistry and Coal Chemistry of the NAS of Ukraine.

The library of the Institute of Industrial Economics was in an extremely difficult situation throughout 2014, as it was located directly in the combat zone near the Sergei Prokofiev Donetsk International Airport. But the library staff continued to work in these extremely difficult conditions: bibliographic editing and translation of annotations into English in the journal «Economics of Industry» were carried out, the «List of Translations of Titles of Major Articles from Foreign

Journals Received by the Library in 2012–2013» was prepared and published, and the electronic catalog was updated. Even in the midst of hostilities, librarians tried not to stop working, to provide services to scientific users, and to preserve the library collection and property.

Note that contact with all of these libraries was lost almost immediately – phones were not answered, emails were returned.

Thus, the quantitative composition of the network in 2014 decreased by ten libraries and since 2015, the network of libraries of scientific institutions of the NAS of Ukraine, together with the V. I. Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine and the V. Stefanyk Lviv National Scientific Library of Ukraine, has 95 libraries. As of January 2014, the libraries of the scientific institutions of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine contained over 9.2 million copies, including 2.8 million copies of foreign documents. In 2015, the libraries of the scientific institutions held 8.3 million copies of documents. Thus, the Russian Federation took away almost one million documents from the library fund of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and therefore the cultural heritage of the Ukrainian people.

We consider the appropriation of cultural heritage in the context of the claim of “one people,” which denies the right of Ukrainians to their own past, separate from their “brotherly people.” Such denial has manifested itself in the appropriation and partial destruction of library collections in annexed and occupied territories.

The staff of the libraries of scientific institutions of the NAS of Ukraine in January 2014 was 263 people, with the reduction of the library network by 10 book collections, there was a corresponding reduction in the number of library employees - by January 2015, there were already 224 people. Thus, the state of staffing of libraries of scientific institutions of the NAS of Ukraine in 2014 was to some extent determined by the political and economic situation that developed in the country and individual regions and led to structural changes in the NAS of Ukraine system.

In the conditions of a long-term war, a constant threat of shelling and missile and drone attacks, and the destruction of energy infrastructure, the library network of the NAS of Ukraine operates in a mode according to the situations: they suspended their work for a certain time, then worked remotely, part-time, with an incomplete staff, but, despite all the difficulties, they tried to ensure the fulfillment of their official duties and provide information and library services to scientific users.

Conclusions. Counteracting Russia's cultural genocide against Ukraine requires developing a mechanism for the effective preservation of national culture and identity in the face of prolonged aggression and growing threats from the aggressor. We are talking about developing tactical and strategic decisions to create conditions for the preservation of national cultural heritage, sustainable restoration and development of national culture and science as an integral component of the process of strengthening the Ukrainian nation.

Prospects for further research. The disclosure of intellectual heritage through the digitization of library collections is an important task of academic libraries. Today, there is an urgent need to introduce these information resources into scientific circulation, because the historical and cultural heritage must be accessible and must actively function in science and public consciousness. After all, the contribution of any people to world culture, through its unique characteristics, shapes the richness and diversity of humanity as a whole. In this context, the destruction of the libraries of scientific institutions of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine is an attack not only against Ukrainian science and the Ukrainian people, but also against world culture and science.

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## **HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE GENOCIDE OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE**

The historical and political aspects of the genocide of the Ukrainian people encompass a complex interplay of numerous historical events, political decisions, and ideological strategies that led to fatal outcomes, the consequences of which could no longer be changed by anyone. Unfortunately, Ukrainian history has seen many such periods since the beginning of state-building and the establishment of national independence.

During the Kyivan Rus' era, the Mongol-Tatar invasion repeatedly attempted to destroy and devastate Kyiv, as in 1240. Although not aiming to exterminate the population, it was accompanied by mass killings and enslavement, leading to the desolation of the Kyiv land and the weakening of national development.

Later, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (16th-18th centuries) began to exert influence over the people of Ukrainian lands. Its actions were characterized by the forceful Polonization and Catholicization of Ukrainians, the prohibition of the Orthodox faith, and the oppression of the peasantry and Cossacks. This can be viewed as an attempt to destroy Ukrainian identity through religious and ethnic assimilation.

However, the Ukrainian lands began to suffer their greatest losses when the Muscovy Tsardom, and later the Russian Empire, came to the territory of our homeland. In the 18th-19th centuries, the policy of the Russian Empire was aimed at cultural and political genocide. In 1775, Catherine II destroyed the Zaporizhian Sich, a symbol of Ukrainian military-political power, carried out repressions against Cossack officers, and settled foreign ethnic groups on Ukrainian lands.

The 19th century saw the Valuev Circular, signed in 1863, and the Ems Ukaz of 1876, both aimed at prohibiting the Ukrainian language, repressing Ukrainian cultural figures, and Russification. Their goal was to erase ethno-cultural identity.

Furthermore, the Russian Empire used Ukrainians during the First World War (1914-1918), where Ukrainians found themselves on opposing sides of the front, as Ukrainian lands were divided between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. This led to the war being called «fratricidal» for Ukraine. Ukrainians were forcibly mobilized and compelled to fight for imperial interests, with their national identity unrecognized, used as «cannon fodder»—thrown into the toughest sections of the front without military uniforms or weapons. Even here, language oppression was present. Ukrainians in the army were forbidden from speaking Ukrainian and were called «Little Russians.»

The genocide of Ukrainians did not end with the Russian Empire. In the 20th century, Ukrainians found themselves under Soviet rule, resulting in immense losses for Ukraine, both in terms of cultural heritage and the physical extermination of its people. Key periods included:

The Famine of 1921-1923 was the first great tragedy when Ukrainians died of starvation in the southern lands. This terror was planned by V.I. Lenin to «re-educate» the Ukrainian peasantry, who resisted the plunder of the Soviet government. The main cause of the 1921-1923 famine was the forced grain requisitions (prodrazvyorstka) and the prohibition of food trade, in addition to crop failure in southern Ukraine. As a result, millions of people suffered from hunger, especially

in the south and east, leading to increased mortality (according to various data, between 500,000 and 1 million people died), cases of cannibalism, and homelessness.

The Holodomor of 1932-1933 was the genocide of the Ukrainian people, organized under the leadership of J. Stalin. Its goal was to suppress resistance to collectivization and the national movement. The artificial seizure of food, the blockade of cities and villages, and the prohibition of movement contributed to the mass deaths of people (from 3 to 7 million).

The Repressions of the 1930s – as part of the «Great Terror,» the Ukrainian cultural, religious, scientific, and political elite were deliberately exterminated. The «Executed Renaissance,» mass arrests and deportations, Russification, and the destruction of Ukrainian educational and cultural institutions—all these led to devastating consequences.

World War II and the post-war period were particularly difficult for the Ukrainian people. Soviet authorities carried out mass deportations of Ukrainians from Western Ukraine, conducted ethnic cleansing, and destroyed national consciousness.

The Sixtiers (Shistdesiatnyky) – a movement of the Ukrainian intelligentsia against Stalinist repressions, Russification, and the restriction of creative freedom and thought. They fought for national and cultural revival. The vast majority of Sixtiers were arrested, dismissed from work, exiled, or killed.

And this is only a small part of all the crimes committed by the Soviet regime during that time

Besides Russia or the USSR, other states also committed genocide against the Ukrainian people. Austria-Hungary (1914-1917) did so during World War I. History records repressions against Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and the imprisonment of thousands of Ukrainians in the Talerhof camp on suspicion of «pro-Russian views» without even conducting a proper investigation.

Germany during World War II prohibited Ukrainian education, press, and culture, and massively exterminated Ukrainians, Roma, and Jews.

Romania during 1918-1940 and 1941-1944 actively Romanized the Ukrainian population in the occupied territories (Southern Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia). During World War II, it carried out repressions against Ukrainians and Jews.

In 2014, Russia began using armed forces against Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. First, the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, then in eastern Ukraine, particularly the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, resulting in the proxy entities «DPR» and «LPR.» On February 24, 2022, a full-scale invasion of Ukraine began.

Bucha, Mariupol, Irpin, Izium, Bakhmut, and many other cities in various regions of Ukraine—Russians razed them to the ground. Numerous killings of civilians have been documented, nameless graves of deceased people appeared on the streets, people lost their homes, which Russians destroyed and looted. Russian military personnel tortured, raped, and executed civilians. Russia deported tens of thousands of Ukrainian children from the occupied territories.

Kharkiv, a city located near the borders with Russia, experienced an attempt by separatists to seize power in 2014, which was suppressed. However, after February 24, Kharkiv became one of the main targets of attack. Kherson became the first regional center captured by Russian troops in March 2022. Although Zaporizhzhia was not occupied, part of the region—including Enerhodar and the Zaporizhzhia NPP—came under Russian control.

In addition, the Russian authorities are creating artificial humanitarian catastrophes (Mariupol, Sievierodonetsk) and destroying critical infrastructure, pursuing a policy of «denazification,» and calling for the liquidation of Ukrainian statehood.

Russia is the main orchestrator of the genocide of the Ukrainian people in the 20th and 21st centuries, although other states also resorted to political violence and ethnic cleansing concerning Ukrainian lands. The most important reasons for this were:

Economic reasons – the Ukrainian SSR was the main breadbasket region of the USSR, hence an attempt to break its economic self-sufficiency.

Ethno-cultural reasons – the desire for the Russification of Ukrainians, the destruction of the intelligentsia, repression against clergy, teachers, and cultural figures.

Geopolitical reasons – Ukraine had strategic importance as a resource-rich territory, which at

all times has had and continues to have a favorable geographical location.

All these attempts to subdue Ukraine show that Ukrainians are a strong nation that, every time someone infringes on their independence, resists the enemy and continues to fight for their national and cultural identity.

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## **CERTAIN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE HOLODOMOR AS A GENOCIDE OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE**

Within the Ukrainian historical context, the period from 1914 to 1945 is marked by the intensity of armed conflicts, widespread manifestations of mass violence, and large-scale humanitarian crises. In particular, according to certain scholarly sources, even the indirect consequences of the Soviet–Ukrainian War of 1917–1921 [1] led to a mass famine in the southern regions of Ukraine between 1921 and 1923, as well as the spread of a typhus epidemic [2]. Due to the chaos and harsh conditions of that era, it remains extremely difficult to determine the precise number of casualties among the Ukrainian population. Nevertheless, some academic estimates suggest that during the famine alone, the number of deaths among Ukrainian children reached several million [3].

Appealing to its readership, the editorial board of the daily political, economic, and literary newspaper *Nova Rada*, in issue No. 13 from the year 1918, offered an analytical assessment of the events that unfolded in the city of Kyiv between January 16 and 23, stating:

«For seven days, the great city was left without bread, without water, without light, without newspapers... For seven days, gunfire and cannonades echoed—not sporadically, but continuously... These were Bolshevik bands ‘liberating’ Kyiv, and with it, all of Ukraine from the ‘bourgeois Central Rada’...» [4].

«A few weeks after this publication, the writer, former Deputy Head of the Central Rada and future Vice President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, S. Yefremov, wrote: ‘For ten days, a city of millions – a city of the unemployed, defenseless children, women, and peaceful civilians – burned in mortal terror. For ten days, death hovered above the heads of innocent people. For ten days, horrors unfolded that drove people mad. For ten days, the Ukrainian will burned...» [5].

Having established control over Ukrainian territories, the Bolshevik regime implemented an aggressive policy of radical Sovietization, which encompassed forced collectivization, repressive dekulakization, and artificially accelerated industrialization. As noted by several historians, the primary aim of these measures was the imposition of Soviet ideology and the subjugation of the Ukrainian population to political control. The very policy of institutionalized intimidation and physical extermination of Ukrainians as a sizable national group may be characterized by the words attributed to Soviet political figure L. Trotsky: «Without Ukrainian coal, iron, ore, grain, and the Black Sea, the existence of Russia is impossible: it will suffocate, and so too will Soviet power...» [6].

Notably, these processes culminated in the Holodomor of 1932–1933, resulting in extensive human tragedy. According to certain isolated analytical estimates based on population census analysis, the number of victims among the peasantry—predominantly ethnic Ukrainians—exceeded seven million individuals [7]. It is important to note that this figure does not account for demographic indicators related to birth rates. Consequently, any assumptions regarding the quantitative or qualitative dimensions of this period remain controversial. In this context, scholarly debates continue to this day. When calculating the death toll, researchers consider not only those who directly perished from starvation, but also those who died indirectly, including individuals executed for violating grain procurement laws and directives, or those who succumbed to disease outbreaks or instances of cannibalism. Within this paradigm, some expert-academic assessments suggest that the total number of deaths caused by starvation and its consequences may have reached up to ten million individuals [8].

The significant international resonance of the Ukrainian Holodomor was first highlighted in 1953 by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-born American lawyer, graduate of the Jan Kazimierz Lviv University, the coiner of the term 'genocide,' and the developer of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) [9]. In his speech dedicated to commemorating the victims of the 20th anniversary of the 1932–1933 Holodomor, the scholar publicly provided a legal assessment of the genocidal nature of the Holodomor, which aimed at the physical destruction of the Ukrainian people and its intelligentsia as the social foundation for the development of culture, science, technology, and national ideas in society [10].

Later, the Anglo-American diplomat and historian of the Soviet period R. Conquest substantiated his unbiased perspective on the issue of genocide in Ukraine. In his research on the history of Soviet terror [11], conducted with the support of experts in Oriental studies at the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University, the scholar drew attention to the scale of the social catastrophe in Soviet Ukraine between 1929 and 1933. According to his estimates, the number of victims during this period exceeded the death toll of World War I (1914–1918).

Among other foreign scholars who conducted fundamental research on the historical and legal aspects of the Soviet regime in Ukraine, A. Bezanson stands out for his focus on the typological similarity between communism and Nazism. In his monograph *The Misfortune of the Century: On Communism, Nazism, and the Uniqueness of the Holocaust* [12], the scholar argues that the goal of the Holodomor in Ukraine was not to break the resistance of the peasantry, as collectivization had already accomplished this task, but rather to eliminate the national existence of the Ukrainian people. A similarly congruent viewpoint is presented by A. Graziosi [13], who highlights the deliberate anti-Ukrainian policy pursued by the Stalinist regime, aimed at overcoming peasant resistance through mass extermination and genocide of the Ukrainian people.

In his monographic work *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1919–1933* [14], D. Mace analyzes the dilemma that arose from the determination of national identity and self-determination in Ukraine under Soviet rule. In this context, the historian places special emphasis on the events of 1932–1933 and their significance within the framework of these contradictions.

One cannot overlook T. Snyder's scholarly work *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* [15]. In this work, the scholar generalizes the most tragic phases of Eastern European history between 1933 and 1945. According to the researcher's conclusions, it was during this period that over fourteen million people were killed by both the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, the majority of whom were Ukrainians or of Jewish descent.

What is remarkable is that these studies were, for the most part, conducted within the academic spheres of the United States and Canada. It is worth noting that due to limited access to documentary sources, most of these studies were based on testimonies from emigrants who were witnesses to the events in question, as well as publications from the Western press. It is also significant that the United States became the first country to officially recognize the 1932–1933 Holodomor as the genocide of the Ukrainian people. In this context, the activities of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, founded in 1967 by the Ukrainian diaspora in New York, played an important role [16]. Thus, in October 1984, the congress, with the participation of world-renowned and highly qualified historians, international lawyers, diplomats, and politicians, established the International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932–1933 Famine in Ukraine [17]. The main objectives of this commission were to collect factual data from documentary sources and testimonies of eyewitnesses for the subsequent presentation of evidence at the UN, with the goal of initiating an international tribunal for the genocide committed by the Soviet regime against the Ukrainian people.

As a result of this initiative, in 1984, the U.S. Congress organized the activities of a parliamentary commission to investigate the famine in Ukraine [18]. Following the work of this temporary body, a report was prepared in 1988, based on which Congress adopted the resolution S.J. Res. 329 [19]. This document designated the week from November 3 to November 10, 1990, as the 'National Week of Remembrance for the Victims of the Famine in Ukraine and to Honor

the Memory of Those Killed Due to Political Repression Resulting from the Russification of Ukrainians Aimed at Suppressing Their National Identity' [20]. Importantly, with this official act, the U.S. Parliament, first and foremost, condemned the Soviet Union's disregard for human rights and expressed sympathy for the victims of the Holodomor.

Secondly, the U.S. President emphasized the Soviet policy aimed at stripping Ukrainians of their national identity. Thirdly, he called on the Soviet government to initiate democratic reforms to ensure the realization of democratic rights and freedoms for the Ukrainian people.

After the declaration of Ukraine's independence, the issue of the legal assessment of the Holodomor as a crime with significant international resonance became relevant at the national level. In this context, despite the well-founded conclusions of authoritative historians, the political regime of that time attempted to either ignore the genocidal nature of the man-made famine in Ukraine or completely deny it. Therefore, the recognition of the 1932–1933 Holodomor as the genocide of the Ukrainian people at the national level gained legal legitimacy only after the signing of the relevant legislative act by President V. Yushchenko in 2006 [21]. In accordance with international law standards [9], this law officially recognized and condemned the Holodomor of the 1930s as a deliberate mass extermination of people—specifically, the Ukrainian people.

In accordance with the general principles of international law, which define the inadmissibility of statutes of limitations for crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court [22] and Ukraine's obligations to apply these provisions for certain criminal offenses under national legislation [23], on May 22, 2009, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) initiated a criminal investigation based on the offense defined in Part 1 of Article 442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [24].

As a result of the pre-trial investigation, in accordance with Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [25], the collected materials were transferred to the Kyiv Court of Appeals. Following Paragraph 8 of Part 1 of Article 6, Articles 240 and 248 of the 1960 Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the court made the decision to close the criminal case due to the death of the accused [26].

The historical and legal analysis, with a particular focus on events that occurred in Ukraine during the first half of the 20th century, allows for a comprehensive assessment of the scale and depth of the consequences of armed conflicts, as well as an analysis of the effectiveness of measures introduced by the international community to regulate the international legal order through the implementation of modern criminal law mechanisms. This approach also contributes to a better understanding of contemporary events, phenomena, and processes with global significance.

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## **SOVIET GENOCIDE: ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY AND ACTIONS IN THE WORKS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS OF THE 1940s**

**Keywords:** genocide, Ukrainian nationalists, Roman Smal-Stocki, Tymofii Sosnovyi, 1940s, Raphael Lemkin.

**Introduction.** The relevance of studying Soviet genocide through the lens of ideology and actions described in the works of Ukrainian nationalists of the 1940s is driven by the necessity of a deep analysis of the causes, mechanisms, and consequences of the systematic extermination of the Ukrainian people. This topic holds particular significance in the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war (2014–2025), as examining past genocidal actions helps to better understand the nature of imperial policies that continue to threaten Ukraine's national existence.

The scientific novelty of this research lies in the fact that, for the first time, the approaches of Ukrainian nationalists to analyzing Soviet policies are systematically examined. Specifically, the study highlights the views of Roman Smal-Stocki and Tymofii Sosnovyi, who thoroughly exposed the methods of the Holodomor, Russification, and repression. Investigating their works allows for a deeper understanding of societal reactions to genocidal actions and contributes significantly to the study of the concept of genocide.

**Objective of the Study.** The objective of this study is to analyze the genocidal actions of the Soviet regime as reflected in the works of Ukrainian nationalists of the 1940s, particularly those of Roman Smal-Stocki and Tymofii Sosnovyi, in order to reveal their perspectives on the causes, methods, and consequences of the genocide of the Ukrainian people.

**Research Results.** The term genocide, recognized as one of the gravest crimes against global peace and human security, first appeared in the book of American lawyer Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – Proposals for Redress*, published in Washington in 1944. Lemkin defined genocide as the extermination of a nation or ethnic group (Lemkin, 1944, cc. 79–95).

Prior to 1944, Ukrainian nationalists did not use the term genocide, yet they had already conceptualized systematic destruction as a threat to national existence, particularly in the context of repression and assimilation policies imposed by occupying regimes. Representatives of the Ukrainian liberation movement regarded the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ratified by 147 countries worldwide, as a critical international document that could serve as a tool for exposing Soviet crimes against the Ukrainian people (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of, 1948).

In the 1948 issue of the journal *Ukrainian Quarterly*, an article titled *Soviet Genocide of the Ukrainian People* was published, signed by the author under the pseudonym Prof. T.S. It is likely that this refers to Professor Tymofii (Timothy) Sosnovyi, the brother of the renowned statistician Stepan Sosnovyi, whom Ukrainian researchers consider to be one of the first scholars to conduct a scientific analysis of the Holodomor (Sosnovyi, 1942).

Tymofii Sosnovyi took an oath of allegiance to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Melnykivtsi) (OUN-M) and was, at least formally, a member of the organization. (Dzhulai, 2018) After the end of World War II, Tymofii emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany, where he became a professor at the Ukrainian Free University. He later moved to the United States and worked at the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences. Using the statistical data of his brother, Stepan, he helped to popularize their findings abroad, making these studies nearly canonical within the Ukrainian diaspora. Over time, his work was utilized in the study of the Holodomor by



the American historian James Mace (Mace, 1983).

According to T. Sosnovyi, «the Ukrainians, caught between the anvil and the hammer, between the brown and red types of imperialism, between Hitler and Stalin, have suffered the heaviest casualties of the war. Nor is there any end to their casualties. The struggle in Ukraine goes on. Right now, as in the past, Ukrainian blood is still being shed daily, as the Ukrainians fight on for their social and national liberation» (T.S., 1948, c. 338).

T. Sosnovyi emphasizes that the history of Ukrainians under Soviet rule is a continuous testimony to systematic terror and a policy of «purges.» The deliberate destruction of Ukrainians as a cultural and national community was carried out gradually and systematically, reaching particular intensity during specific historical periods. The primary goal of the Soviet government was to reduce the Ukrainian population by any means necessary. This strategy compelled Moscow to use all available methods to eliminate Ukrainians as a national community, including:

- a) direct physical extermination of Ukrainians and their deportation beyond Ukraine,
- b) systematic policies of denationalization and Russification,
- c) colonial exploitation of Ukraine by Russian authorities.

One of the earliest tragic phases occurred during the initial years of collectivization when repressive policies simultaneously targeted both the Ukrainian peasantry and the intelligentsia, which played a leading and educating role in society. Sosnovyi presents statistical data indicating that between the population censuses of 1926 and 1939, the number of Ukrainian peasant households significantly declined by at least 10% (approximately 500,000 units). These households were abandoned due to the policy of dekulakization or because residents were forced to flee their homes to escape repression. Estimates suggest that around 2.3 million Ukrainians were forcibly displaced from their homes during this period. To this figure, the author adds at least half a million Ukrainian workers and professionals who fell victim to the Soviet regime's repressive measures. The majority of them were either physically eliminated or deported to Soviet concentration camps.

These data demonstrate the significant demographic losses the Ukrainian population suffered due to the Soviet government's deliberate policies aimed at destroying social and professional groups that could pose a threat to the regime.

The trials of the 1930s, particularly the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU), served as a formal pretext for mass arrests of social groups that were conscious of their national identity. The repressions targeted not only the intelligentsia but also other professional groups, such as agricultural and forestry specialists, who faced fabricated accusations. As an example of the scale of losses among Ukraine's leading class, Sosnovyi cites a statement from the newspaper *Kommunist*, the official publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, dated May 19, 1931, which noted that «twenty thousand schools in Ukraine were without teachers at that time.» This highlights the devastating impact of Soviet policies on education and the intellectual potential of the Ukrainian people.

T. Sosnovyi concludes that during the period from 1926 to 1939, approximately 10.3 million Ukrainians disappeared from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. Let us recall their fate: a portion perished during the famine of 1932–1933, with the number of deaths reaching 4.8 million; another group, approximately 2.8 million, either fled or were deported; additionally, the famine led to a decrease in births by 2.7 million. (T.S., 1948, c. 330).

Considering colonial exploitation as a method of genocidal policy by the Soviet Union toward Ukraine, T. Sosnovyi argues that Ukraine, under Soviet rule, exhibits all the characteristics of a colony whose population is subjected to economic exploitation and the crime of genocide. This is evidenced by statistical data: 88.6% of Ukrainians are engaged in agriculture. Proportionally, the smallest number of Ukrainians hold administrative positions, which are predominantly occupied by non-Ukrainians, mostly brought in from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. (T.S., 1948, c. 337).

The author emphasizes: «finally war came to an end, but there was no end to the genocide policy

of the Soviets in Ukraine» (T.S., 1948, c. 338). The fact that all Ukrainian ethnic lands ended up within the borders of the Soviet Union significantly facilitated Moscow's implementation of repressive policies. The population of Western Ukraine was systematically deported to Siberia, while in Ukrainian territories that became part of the new borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the targeted extermination of Ukrainians was carried out with the tacit approval of Soviet authorities. At the same time, the Ukrainian SSR was continually subjected to «purges,» conducted under the leadership of Soviet officials such as Pavlo Postyshev, Lazar Kaganovich, Nikita Khrushchev, and others who positioned themselves as «experts» on Ukrainian affairs.

Thus, the stance of Ukrainian scholar T. Sosnovyi aligns with Raphael Lemkin's concept of genocide, which defines it as a set of deliberate actions carried out according to a plan. The objective of such a plan is the destruction of political and social institutions, culture, language, national spirits, religion, and the economy. In turn, this leads to the undermining of personal security, freedom, health, dignity, and even the lives of individuals belonging to such groups. Consequently, genocide is directed against a national group as a collective entity, and the corresponding actions target individuals not at a personal level, but as members of the national group. (Lemkin, 1944, c. 79).

R. Smal-Stocki (1893–1969) was a prominent figure in the Ukrainian national liberation movement and a diplomat of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). He played a key role in Ukraine's international representation, notably serving as the UNR ambassador to Berlin from 1921 to 1923. In exile, he became one of the leaders of the UNR State Center and actively collaborated with Polish political circles that sought to establish a federation of independent states on the territories of the former Soviet Union. R. Smal-Stocki was also an active member of the Prometheus League, which emerged in the interwar period, uniting émigré groups from Soviet-ruled nations with the goal of liberating the peoples oppressed by the Soviet Union. From the League's foundation, Smal-Stocki served as its leader, playing a crucial role in the strategic development of the organization. (Sectoral State Archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, 1950).

In his study *The Convention on Genocide*, R. Smal-Stocki was among the first to call on democratic states to use the provisions of the UN Convention to investigate the Holodomor, repressions, and other genocidal actions carried out by the Soviet authorities. He emphasized the necessity of holding the USSR accountable for violations of the rights of national, ethnic, and religious groups, as well as the importance of international recognition of Soviet genocide as a crime against humanity.

The study consists of four sections: «What is Genocide?», «The History of Soviet Genocide,» «The Ideological Basis of Soviet Genocide, Its Objectives, Methods, and Results,» and «An Appeal to Democratic Christian States, Signatories of the Convention on Genocide.» Overall, this scholarly work aimed to mobilize the global community in the fight against totalitarianism and the defense of Ukrainian rights.

The Convention became a starting point for further analysis of Soviet crimes and the mechanisms of their legitimization in the international context. The scholar presents several critical observations that highlight the limitations of the international document in addressing Soviet crimes against non-Russian nationalities. Firstly, the list of acts defined as genocide is largely based on crimes committed by the Nazis, while Soviet atrocities, both past and present, remain overlooked. Secondly, the definition includes religious, ethnic, national, and racial groups—those groups on which consensus was reached—while professional, social, class, and political groups are excluded from the crime of genocide. This approach likely excludes Soviet crimes, which are often justified as a fight against «rebels» or «saboteurs,» thereby opening the possibility for the «legalization» of genocidal actions.

According to R. Smal-Stocki, the Soviet communist dictatorship actively manipulated the Convention to avoid international accountability while simultaneously advancing its propaganda goals. Thus, the document proved ineffective in protecting non-Russian nationalities from destruction. The illusion that the Convention represented significant progress in combating

genocides turned out to be misleading. In fact, the UN Assembly adopted a document that not only failed to ensure punishment for Soviet crimes but also enabled their continued neglect in international law.

The scholar provides compelling examples from the history of Soviet genocide, demonstrating the systematic use of repression, famine, Russification, and denationalization as means of exterminating the Ukrainian people and other non-Russian nationalities.

As evidence of the targeted genocidal policy aimed at destroying national identity and cultural heritage, R. Smal-Stocki points to the destruction of the Ukrainian peasant class, which became one of the key elements of the Soviet regime's repressive policies. During the NEP period, Ukrainian peasantry played an important role in shaping the national idea, which disturbed the Soviet authorities. In 1932–1933, Stalin deliberately organized a famine in the region known as the breadbasket of Europe, resulting in the deaths of at least four to five million peasants. Mass deportations to Siberia and show trials, including the ones against the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, became tools for eliminating a significant portion of the Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia.

The scholar pays particular attention to the tragic fates of prominent Ukrainian communists, such as Panas Lyubchenko, head of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, and Mykola Skrypnyk, Minister of Education and a longtime associate of Lenin. Their suicides became acts of protest against Stalin's brutal policies aimed at exterminating the Ukrainian national elite. These events underscore the scale and deliberate nature of Soviet repressions, which sought to destroy Ukrainian identity.

Before and during World War II, the Stalinist regime carried out mass killings of Ukrainian intelligentsia, particularly in Vinnytsia, Lviv, Stanislaviv, and Kolomyia, where the NKVD left mass graves containing nearly 10,000 victims. Repressions also targeted the democratic elite of Western Ukraine: leading members of democratic parties, including the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Socialist Party, were killed or sent to forced labor camps. These actions aimed to destroy the national identity and intellectual potential of non-Russian peoples.

These facts largely explain why Soviet representatives categorically opposed including the physical extermination of entire racial groups—motivated by political or economic reasons—in the list of genocide crimes.

For a deeper understanding of Soviet mass terror policies, R. Smal-Stocki draws attention to the ideological foundations that justified genocide as a tool of state governance. Specifically, communist ideology, based on the teachings of Marx and Lenin, viewed terror as a necessary instrument for achieving world revolution, thereby legitimizing the systematic destruction of entire groups—what is now recognized as genocide. The Soviet government and Communist Party legalized terror as the foundation of the «dictatorship of the proletariat,» using it to maintain minority rule over the majority, as well as an effective method for suppressing opposition, framing it as the «elimination of enemies of the people.»

Examining German wartime practices during World War II, R. Lemkin emphasizes that genocide is a systematic phenomenon that encompasses a comprehensive set of methods of extermination: political, social, cultural, religious, moral, economic, biological, and physical. (Lemkin, 1944, cc. 81–89).

Communist ideology developed a systematic approach to genocide, which R. Smal-Stocki conditionally divides into four stages:

Stage I focuses on the elimination of the intelligentsia, national leaders, and prominent figures who symbolize the «brain» of the nation. Mass repressions against these groups paralyze the entire body of the victim nation, rendering it incapable of organized resistance.

Stage II, often accompanying the first, involves the destruction of church institutions. Christianity, its hierarchy, and clergy are perceived as threats to communist ideology, making their removal essential for further weakening of national identity. This is an attack on the «soul» of the nation.

Stage III targets the eradication of the peasantry, which serves as the bearer of traditions,

folklore, literature, and language. This destroys the ethnographic foundation of the nation and creates the prerequisites for the next stage.

Stage IV entails the resettlement of the territory with other ethnic groups, such as Russians or Asian peoples, with the aim of assimilation and the creation of a mixed ethnic community. (Smal-Stocky, 1949, c. 153).

This approach demonstrates the deliberate and systematic nature of genocide policy within communist ideology.

Labor camps, administered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union, served as an operational tool for implementing the first three stages of Soviet genocide. Their primary function was to extract physical resources from doomed population groups for the benefit of the Soviet economy until their eventual death from starvation, exhaustion, or violence.

As the author of the study notes, the goal of such «social engineering» was to create a new «communist Soviet nation»—the so-called «Soviet people,» formed from subjugated nationalities. This new «amalgamation» was meant to lose memory of its religion, traditions, political objectives, and language.

Beyond its international objectives, this policy also had a nationalist dimension. Soviet genocide facilitated Russification, or, in party terminology, «Sovietization» of territories that were geopolitically significant for Moscow. Russification was actively supported by a large-scale propaganda campaign that positioned the Russian language as the «world language of the international proletariat» in all spheres of Soviet influence. The propaganda of the «language of internationalism» and the ideology of «international Soviet genocide» mutually reinforced each other. Russian nationalist and internationalist communist ambitions, combined with the messianic aspirations of the «ruling nation,» were integrated into a large-scale movement targeting the Baltic states, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Siberia, and other regions within the sphere of Soviet Russian influence.

These facts provide a logical explanation for why Soviet Moscow maintained a statistical «Iron Curtain» for decades. This effort was aimed at concealing the consequences of Soviet genocide from the international community. The theoretical population of 300 million, projected as the result of the country's development, contrasts sharply with the actual 190 million, indicating a deficit of over 100 million people. While some of this deficit can be explained by losses during the two world wars and the civil war of 1918–1920, a significant portion is the result of Soviet genocide. This policy also led to two other characteristic features of the Soviet Union: an acute labor shortage and a surplus of nearly 10 million women over men—a phenomenon unparalleled in any other country. (Smal-Stocky, 1949, c. 155).

The aspects outlined by R. Smal-Stocki highlight the need for a deeper review of international legislation and its effective application to ensure proper protection of national communities from genocide.

Addressing democratic states, the scholar notes that the signing of the Convention with the USSR «is an insult to the human dignity of all nations oppressed by the Soviet Union and an outrage against human decency and common sense,» (Smal-Stocky, 1949, c. 161).

Before signing the Convention on Genocide, democratic states should have set conditions for the participation of the Soviet Union in this international document. Among the key requirements could have been:

(a) An official renunciation by the Soviet regime of the use of terror and violence in both domestic and foreign policy, including the dissolution of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD);

(b) The establishment of an independent judiciary that guarantees fair trials without political interference;

(c) The immediate opening of all labor camps for international investigation under the auspices of the UN, as well as the formation of a competent tribunal to assess the scale of repressions and determine accountability for crimes;

(d) The dissolution of the Communist Party dictatorship, which would entail the party losing its monopoly on power and the establishment of democratic governance principles. (Smal-Stocky,

1949, c. 162).

Only such bold measures by democratic states, according to R. Smal-Stocki, can assist democratic underground movements of oppressed nations and religions within the Soviet Union and beyond the «Iron Curtain.» They will contribute to the implementation of international norms for the prevention of genocide and ensure the protection of human rights in the USSR.

In 1953, during events commemorating the anniversary of the Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932–1933, R. Lemkin delivered his prominent speech Soviet Genocide in Ukraine. In this speech, he represented R. Smal-Stocki's classification of the four stages of Soviet policy aimed at destroying the Ukrainian nation: the liquidation of the intelligentsia as the «brain of the nation,» the destruction of national churches as the «soul of the nation,» the extermination of the peasantry through famine in 1932–1933 as the «body of the nation,» and the dispersal of the Ukrainian people through forced resettlement. (Lemkin, Soviet genocide in Ukraine, 2009, cc. 31–36).

Conclusions. The study of Soviet genocide through the works of Ukrainian nationalists of the 1940s allows structured critique of Soviet policies aimed at the destruction of the Ukrainian nation. In the works of Roman Smal-Stocki and Tymofii Sosnovyi, emphasis is put on the systematic mechanisms of annihilation—ranging from physical extermination to cultural and identity erosion. The significance of these works lies not only in documenting facts but also in shaping a conceptual framework for further examination of Soviet repressive policies as manifestations of genocide. Smal-Stocki and Sosnovyi highlight the multifaceted nature of destruction, including physical elimination, cultural assimilation, and forced resettlement.

Building upon the research of Ukrainian scholars, Raphael Lemkin integrates Soviet policies toward Ukraine into the broader international discourse on genocide, demonstrating their alignment with the criteria of the crime as defined by the UN Convention.

Thus, the analysis of these works substantiates the assertion that the Soviet regime pursued a deliberate policy of genocide against the Ukrainian nation, employing complex methods to dismantle its foundational structures. The study of these ideological and practical aspects is crucial for historical justice and the preservation of national memory.

Prospects for Further Research. Investigating the ideological foundations of Soviet policy toward Ukraine, including its justification and propaganda, may shed light on the mechanisms used to formulate repressive strategies in modern-day Russia. Examining both the similarities and differences in the approaches of Ukrainian nationalists and international scholars in analyzing genocide will offer a deeper understanding of the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon. Such research could contribute to a more comprehensive interpretation of Soviet genocide and its long-term impact on the Ukrainian nation.

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## **UKRAINIAN CHILDREN IN THE GRIP OF GENOCIDE: DEPORTATIONS, FORCED ADOPTIONS, LOSS OF IDENTITY AND SILENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

The thesis highlights the problem of genocide of Ukrainian children during the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation: deportations to the occupied territories and to the Russian Federation, forced adoptions, change of citizenship and language. The author outlines the legal context of these actions as a crime against humanity and a crime of genocide under international law. The reaction of the international community is analyzed and directions for further research and action to protect children are proposed.

Keywords: genocide, deportation, Ukrainian children, forced adoption, identity, international law, war in Ukraine.

Introduction: Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, the world has witnessed systemic violations of human rights, including children's rights. Of particular concern is the situation of Ukrainian children in the war zone or in the temporarily occupied territories. There have been numerous cases of forced deportation of children to the Russian Federation or government-controlled territories, where they are subjected to ideological indoctrination, assimilation, and sometimes change their citizenship and receive new names. This practice is a gross violation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and can be classified as an element of genocide under Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).

Crimes aimed at changing the national identity of children have lasting consequences for national memory and the social fabric of a country. In this context, the international community should not only condemn such actions, but also take concrete measures to return children and bring perpetrators to justice. However, the response of many international organizations remains sluggish, raising serious questions about the effectiveness of the international human rights mechanism.

Objective: To investigate the phenomenon of deportation of Ukrainian children as a component of genocide, to characterize forced adoption and loss of identity, and to analyze the international response to these crimes.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2022, numerous cases of forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and the temporarily occupied territories have been recorded. According to Human Rights Watch, more than 19,000 children have been removed from Ukraine, and only 1,236 of them have been returned. [1]

These actions violate Article II(e) of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which defines the forcible transfer of children from one group to another as an act of genocide. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Children's Ombudsman Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in these

crimes. [2]

The Russian authorities are actively promoting the adoption of deported Ukrainian children by Russian families. This process is accompanied by a change of names, citizenship and identity of the children. Such actions violate Article 8 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which guarantees the right of the child to preserve his or her identity.

Historical parallels can be drawn with the policy of Nazi Germany, where children from the occupied territories were forcibly adopted and raised in the spirit of Nazi ideology. Russia's current practice has similar features aimed at assimilating Ukrainian children and destroying their national identity. [3]

Deported Ukrainian children are subjected to systematic Russification: they are forbidden to speak Ukrainian "I was forbidden to speak Ukrainian. When I spoke, I was scolded and told that the Ukrainian language does not exist" – a 13-year-old boy returned from the Bryansk region. [7]

After the children are taken away, they are subjected to propaganda and Russification. Russian history and culture are actively imposed, names and surnames are changed. This is a form of cultural genocide aimed at destroying Ukrainian national identity.

The main goal is to erase national identity. The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman recorded massive cases of the occupiers beating children for calling themselves Ukrainians.

Children's names, surnames, and dates of birth were changed, and they were given Russian documents. This not only violates international norms, but also effectively erases the child from Ukrainian reality.

The children talk about attempts to convince them that Ukraine is a "wrong state" and that Russia is a "savior." Russian symbols were imposed on them and they were forced to sing the Russian anthem.

Some children, after a long stay in Russian boarding schools or foster families, began to identify themselves with the "Russian people." This shows the depth of psychological manipulation. [7]

International law clearly defines forced displacement and adoption of children as crimes. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court classify such actions as genocide and crimes against humanity.

In the case of Ukraine, the International Criminal Court has already issued arrest warrants for Russian officials responsible for the deportation of children. This sets a precedent for further prosecution of those responsible for these crimes.

The international community has expressed concern about the situation of Ukrainian children. The UN, UNICEF, and the International Committee of the Red Cross call for the immediate return of the deported children and the prosecution of those responsible. [5]

However, the effectiveness of these efforts is limited by political and legal obstacles. It is necessary to increase international pressure on Russia and create mechanisms to ensure the rights of Ukrainian children. [6]

Many Ukrainian children who have been deported to Russia report on their experiences of abuse, forced Russification and psychological pressure upon their return. These testimonies confirm the systematic nature of crimes against Ukrainian children. «There is no Ukraine anymore. Your parents don't need you» - Russians abduct children after their parents have been killed or arrested by the occupiers, under the pretext of children's «summer camps» or even treatment, sometimes deliberately inventing diagnoses. Children are also abducted from Ukrainian state institutions located in the temporarily occupied territories. Parents in the TOT are often deprived of parental rights under false pretenses. Or they are simply separated from their children during filtration measures in special camps. Children living in the frontline areas and where Russian troops are stationed are most often abducted. One of the most common manipulations is the offensive of the Ukrainian military, with which they say American mercenaries will come and rape girls and women, said Myroslava Kharchenko, a lawyer at Save Ukraine. Because of this, women and children often flee with the Russian military, and then end up in shelters, from which our human rights activists try to rescue them. [4]

Documentary evidence gathered by human rights organizations and journalists shows the scale



and organization of these crimes. This includes videos, photographs, official documents and eyewitness accounts.

History knows many examples of forced displacement and assimilation of children as elements of genocide. This includes the actions of Nazi Germany, indigenous policies in Canada and Australia, and the Rwandan genocide.

In all of these cases, children were the targets of a policy of destroying national identity. The current situation in Ukraine has much in common with these historical examples, which underscores the seriousness of the threat.

Deportation and forced adoption have profound psychological consequences for children: post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, sleep and speech disorders. These traumas can have a long-term impact on their lives and development.

For a society, the loss of a generation of children means a threat to national identity, culture and future development. Psychological support and reintegration of affected children should be provided.

Ukraine is actively working to return deported children. The Bringing Children Home initiative aims to identify, locate and repatriate affected children. As of February 2025, 388 children have been returned. [7]

Psychological and social support is also provided to families affected by the deportation of children. However, the process is complicated due to Russia's refusal to cooperate and provide information on the whereabouts of children.

Proposals for strengthening the international response and creating prevention mechanisms: establishing a special international tribunal to investigate crimes against Ukrainian children; strengthening sanctions against individuals and organizations involved in deportation and forced adoption; developing international mechanisms to monitor and prevent similar crimes in the future; providing support and reintegration of affected children through international programs and funds.

Conclusions. As a result of the analysis, it can be concluded that the actions of the "sworn neighbor" against Ukrainian children are not isolated incidents, but a systematic policy that has signs of a crime of genocide. The purpose of such actions is to destroy the Ukrainian national identity through children, who are the bearers of the future. The international community, although it condemns such actions in words, demonstrates a lack of effective measures. Therefore, Ukraine should insist on the creation of a special tribunal to investigate such crimes, as well as actively cooperate with international organizations to return the children home.

The relevance of this issue requires in-depth study not only in terms of documenting crimes, but also in the interdisciplinary, comparative and prognostic dimensions. In this regard, the following areas of scientific research are advisable:

1. Psychological trauma and identity: Study the long-term psycho-emotional consequences of deportation, family loss, and identity change for children. Psychotherapeutic protocols for support and reintegration should be developed.
2. Cultural assimilation as a form of genocide: A comparative study of assimilation policies in the twentieth century - from Russification programs to Canadian "boarding schools" for indigenous peoples.
3. Digital technologies in the identification and return of children: An analysis of the effectiveness of databases, digital tracking, media campaigns and international platforms in locating abducted children.
4. International law and case law: Comparative analysis of cases related to war crimes against children in the practice of the International Criminal Court and the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals.
5. The role of civil society, the church and the diaspora: Research of non-governmental initiatives, activities of volunteer structures, religious institutions in the return of children and restoration of their national roots.
6. National reintegration policy: The study of mechanisms of social support, educational

and legal assistance that form the basis for the restoration of a child's integral national identity.

These areas are of strategic value not only for overcoming the consequences of the current tragedy, but also for shaping the doctrine of child rights protection in the future.

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## **LEGAL ANALYSIS OF GENOCIDE AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME: PROBLEMATIC ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS**

In the context of historical events, the crime of genocide emerged after the Nuremberg Trials. In fact, it was shaped as a distinct category of international crimes, separate from crimes against humanity. Specifically, on December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly adopted two important resolutions, 95 (I) and 96 (I) [1]. These documents proposed the inclusion of genocide, alongside the crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, in the general classification of international crimes. The adoption of this decision was primarily justified by the fact that genocide, by its very nature, has a global resonance that requires separate intervention and the provision of an appropriate legal evaluation in a global context.

In order to establish international criminal responsibility for genocide, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted on December 9, 1948 [2]. This legal document emphasized the importance of international condemnation of the «crime of genocide» and provided the definition of this term.

The primary aim of genocide is the complete or partial destruction of a protected group of people distinguished from others. This narrative is reflected in the disposition of Article 442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [3], which states that genocide consists of intentional acts committed with the aim of «the complete or partial destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group...».

In other words, genocide is an attack on human diversity [4]. It is known that this term emerged in the aftermath of the Holocaust, etymologically incorporating the Greek word «γένος», meaning «kin» in an ethnological sense, and the Latin verb «caedere» – «to cut down» [5]. According to international law, genocide is considered the only international crime that criminalizes acts of public or direct incitement to commit serious violations of international law [2]. This aspect was also highlighted by the national legislator in the qualifying characteristics of the criminal offense under part 2 of Article 421 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [3].

The essence of genocide lies in the demographic extermination of a specific national, ethnic, racial, or religious group of people. In other words, when referring to the victims of genocide, the focus is primarily on specific, protected segments of society. This means that other groups, such as political or cultural groups, according to international law, are not protected, and therefore their extermination does not fall under this category [6]. This issue has sparked many debates. In particular, some scholars argue that genocide does not necessarily require the actual physical (biological) destruction of a social group, meaning that destruction can occur at the level of national identity or self-awareness.

Since the cultural aspect is crucial for explaining or defining, or even identifying the racial, ethnic, religious, or national affiliation or identity of a society, it is clear that cultural destruction can be seen as one of the forms of genocide [4]. In analyzing this issue, it is important to emphasize that, under modern conditions, the national content of a state's functions has become of particular

significance. This characteristic refers to the state's activities aimed at ensuring and developing national culture, language, traditions, as well as ensuring the existence of an ethnic group that functions in a state-organizational form, identified through appropriate state institutions. Therefore, it is believed that culture, alongside the military, economic, and technological development of a state, serves as one of the key factors determining its global leadership on the geopolitical stage.

For Ukraine, the issue of national self-awareness and national identity has always had a special context. Throughout the existence of the Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian people constantly experienced ethnocide, which was coupled with numerous political and ideological repressions, bans, and deportations. The pinnacle of this terror was the Holodomor of the 1930s, which was aimed at the physical extermination of Ukrainians as an ethnic group.

According to the Vice-Chancellor of Germany, R. Goecke, during the Bundestag's adoption of the resolution recognizing the Holodomor as the genocide of the Ukrainian people: «This horror had its cause in the Kremlin, where the dictator made a brutal decision to force collectivization and provoke famine, and the killing by starvation aimed at political repression against Ukrainian national identity, Ukrainian culture, and language...» [7].

In fact, the cultural aspect could very well complement the concept of «genocide» as: «the destruction of national self-awareness and national identity of a particular social group or the dominant part of the population and territory of a given country, through the implementation of organizational repressive measures, grounded in a political or ideological framework.»

A separate scientific interest in further research on the essence, content, and significance of genocide is raised by the issue related to wartime genocide, particularly its concealed form aimed at specific ethnic groups within a single country. One such form is the large-scale mobilization of the male population from these groups and their mass use for military purposes with the aim of their physical destruction on the battlefield by the enemy.

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# LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR COUNTERACTING GENOCIDE AND MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

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## LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF COUNTERING GENOCIDE AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

The article is devoted to the analysis of the legal principles of combating genocide as a crime of an international nature, as well as the consideration of the mechanisms of legal responsibility for its commission. International and national approaches to the qualification of genocide are revealed, attention is focused on the activities of international judicial institutions, and a review of current examples from international practice is made, in particular in the context of the conflict in Myanmar. The need to strengthen the legal mechanism for preventing genocide and punishing the perpetrators is substantiated.

Genocide is one of the most serious international crimes that affects the very existence of groups of people on the basis of national, ethnic, racial or religious affiliation. The term was first introduced into scientific circulation by the Polish lawyer of Jewish origin Rafal Lemkin in 1944, who combined two concepts: *genos* (people) and *caedere* (to kill) [1]. In the post-war period, the world community responded to the mass atrocities of the Nazi regime by adopting the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948 [2].

Despite the existence of clear international legal prohibitions, the crimes of genocide have not disappeared: the events in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, and today in Myanmar, demonstrate the limits of the effectiveness of existing legal mechanisms.

The main international legal act that establishes the concept of genocide is the 1948 UN Convention [2]. It defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Such acts include: killing members of the group, causing them serious harm, deliberately creating unbearable living conditions for it, forced sterilization, forcible transfer of children, etc.

This Convention obliges states to prevent genocide and punish its commission both in peacetime and in wartime. At the same time, the text of the document itself does not specify clear mechanisms for enforcing the implementation of its provisions [2].

The fight against genocide was subsequently institutionalized through the establishment of specialized international criminal courts mandated to prosecute perpetrators of such crimes.

After the conflicts of the 1990s, the international community established two important precedents in the area of criminal responsibility for genocide: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The ICTY's decisions in the Prosecutor v. Krajisnik case and the ICTR's decisions in the Prosecutor v. Akayesu case were the first to classify the crimes as genocide [3].

The tribunals' cases established that the crime of genocide requires not only the commission of relevant acts but also the proof of a specific intent (*dolus specialis*) – the deliberate destruction of a protected group. This is what creates the main difficulty in proving such crimes.

The permanent international court with jurisdiction over genocide is the International Criminal Court (ICC), established by the Rome Statute of 1998 [4]. It has the power to prosecute

individuals, regardless of their status in a state, in cases where national justice systems are unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute. The ICC has opened a number of cases to date, including in Sudan, Kenya, Myanmar, Libya and the Central African Republic. However, its effectiveness is often questioned due to political constraints and the lack of jurisdiction over a number of states (including the United States, China and Israel) [4].

Some states have introduced a mechanism of universal jurisdiction in their national legislation, which allows for the prosecution of crimes of genocide regardless of the place of their commission and the nationality of the suspect. Germany is the most active in this regard: its courts have already handed down verdicts for crimes committed in Syria, based on the principle of universality [5].

This creates an additional tool when international mechanisms are not working or are blocked.

In 2017–2022, numerous international human rights organizations, investigative journalists and governments began to speak out about possible signs of genocide in the actions of the Myanmar armed forces against the Rohingya. These include:

- the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people to Bangladesh (violation of Article II(e) of the Convention) [2];
- systematic attacks on villages, burning of homes and killing of civilians;
- hate speech in official rhetoric and state media [3].

The domestic legislation of some states, including Bangladesh and Gambia, provides for mechanisms for gathering evidence for submission to the ICC and the International Court of Justice.

The most difficult element in genocide cases is proving the direct intent to destroy the group as such. Unlike war crimes or crimes against humanity, genocide requires the identification of a specific motivation of the perpetrator.

This is why international prosecutors often choose to qualify it as “crimes against humanity”, where the existence of intent is easier to prove [3].

Genocide, as a crime aimed at destroying entire groups of people on the basis of nationality, race, religion or ethnicity, is not only the most barbaric crime against humanity, but also a challenge to the international legal order. For more than seventy years since the adoption of the 1948 UN Convention, the world community has not developed a universal and effective mechanism for the prevention of genocide. Moreover, attempts to punish perpetrators remain fragmented, dependent on political will and the ability of institutions to overcome legal and diplomatic barriers.

The examples of judicial practice analyzed in this article – ICTY, ICTR, ICC – confirm that the international community has the tools to hold those guilty of genocide accountable. However, the application of these tools faces significant difficulties. First, there is the problem of proving the subjective element of the crime – the specific intent to destroy a specific group. Second, there is a limitation of the jurisdiction of the ICC, which does not cover all countries in the world and depends on the voluntary cooperation of states. Third, conflicts of interest between states often paralyze the activities of international institutions.

In this context, the development of national mechanisms for prosecuting genocide is important. The example of Germany, which applies the principle of universal jurisdiction, demonstrates that a state, even if not involved in a specific conflict, can and should administer justice. This principle should be extended to other jurisdictions, as it allows filling the gaps in international justice and combating impunity. The situation of the Rohingya in Myanmar, which has gained wide international publicity after 2017, has revealed new challenges for international law. The documented facts of deportation of children, mass killings, torture, forced displacement, destruction of culture and national identity fall under the elements of genocide defined in international law. That is why the legal assessment of these actions, which the International Criminal Court must give, will be decisive not only for the affected community, but also for the entire future of the system of international responsibility.

To effectively combat genocide, coordination between international structures, national judicial bodies, human rights organizations, and academic institutions is necessary. In addition to legal mechanisms, education, the study of past tragedies, and the development of respect for human

rights as the basis for preventing the recurrence of genocides are important.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the fight against genocide is a complex task that requires the synergy of international law, state sovereignty, and the moral responsibility of humanity. Only through continuous improvement of legal mechanisms, political determination, and historical memory can we guarantee that humanity will never again face the tragedy of genocide.

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## **INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GENOCIDE: CHALLENGES OF THE UKRAINIAN REALITY**

**Keywords:** genocide, international law, crimes against humanity, accountability, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Rome Statute, International Criminal Court.

**Introduction.** In the 21st century, genocide—one of the gravest international crimes against humanity – remains alarmingly relevant, despite the international community's declared commitment to the values of peace, human rights, and the rule of law. Contemporary conflicts, in spite of numerous international treaties and institutional mechanisms, reveal the global community's inability to prevent mass atrocities aimed at the physical extermination of specific ethnic, national, or religious groups. A particularly tragic example in recent history is the armed conflict initiated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014, which escalated into a full-scale invasion in 2022. The war has been marked by mass killings of civilians, systematic shelling of civilian infrastructure, the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the destruction of national identity through language, culture, and symbolism – acts that collectively bear all the hallmarks of genocide under international law. In this context, it is crucial to rethink and strengthen the legal foundations of genocide prevention, as well as to identify effective mechanisms for holding perpetrators accountable at both the international and national levels.

**Research Findings.** In contemporary international law, the prevention and punishment of genocide is primarily based on the provisions of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [1], as well as the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [2], which defines genocide as an international crime for which individuals bear personal criminal responsibility.

The key elements of the anti-genocide framework include:

- the legal definition of the term «genocide,» encompassing acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group;
- the obligation of states to prevent and punish the crime of genocide, even when committed in the territory of another state;
- the possibility of prosecuting perpetrators at the international level regardless of their official status (including heads of state).

At the national level, the legal foundations for combating genocide in Ukraine are based on the provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, in particular Article 442, which criminalizes genocide as an especially grave crime against peace, the security of humanity, and the international legal order [3]. While Ukraine's legislative framework generally aligns with international standards, its practical implementation remains limited due to challenges in the collection and proper documentation of evidence, as well as the need to develop an effective model of cooperation with international investigative bodies.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine, ongoing since 2014 and especially intensified after February 24, 2022, has been accompanied by numerous crimes that may be qualified as acts of genocide against the Ukrainian people. These include mass killings of civilians, the forced transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia, the systematic destruction of Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions, and state-level hate speech [4; 5].

Under international law, the principal mechanisms for holding perpetrators accountable for genocide include: (1) the activities of the International Criminal Court; (2) the establishment of special international tribunals; and (3) the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction by



national courts.

Under international law, responsibility for genocide is primarily established by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which obligates state parties both to prevent genocide and to prosecute those responsible [1]. Based on this Convention, the international community has developed mechanisms of criminal prosecution, particularly through the activities of international criminal tribunals and the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).

Examples of the effective implementation of these mechanisms include:

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): Former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda was sentenced to life imprisonment for his leading role in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. This marked the first time in history that a head of government was convicted of genocide [6].

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): General Ratko Mladić was found guilty of genocide in Srebrenica in 1995 and sentenced to life imprisonment [7]. Other high-ranking officials, including Radovan Karadžić, were also held accountable [8].

The International Criminal Court (ICC): In the Darfur (Sudan) case, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes [9]. Although he has not yet been apprehended, the case represents a significant precedent for the prosecution of a sitting head of state.

All these examples demonstrate that international legal mechanisms can serve as effective tools for holding perpetrators accountable for genocide. At the same time, the practice of such courts has revealed a number of challenges, including the lengthy duration of proceedings, difficulties in gathering evidence, and political obstacles.

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, human rights organizations and Ukrainian authorities have documented numerous crimes that may qualify as elements of genocide (in particular, the deportation of children [5], mass executions of civilians, and systematic destruction of cultural heritage). In 2023, Ukraine submitted an application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging that Russia had violated the Genocide Convention. Additionally, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Commissioner for Children's Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, for the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children [10].

In 2024-2025, this case entered a new stage of development. In May 2024, the ICC released additional materials detailing the systematic practice of forced Russification and the transfer of Ukrainian children to specialized institutions in the Russian Federation, qualifying this as a crime of genocide under Article 6 of the Convention. New arrest warrants were issued for mid- and high-level officials in Russia's Ministry of Defense and the administrations of occupied territories. These officials were implicated in the establishment of so-called "rehabilitation centers" for Ukrainian children, which in reality served as sites of ideological indoctrination and psychological abuse.

Additionally, in January 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in the case *Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia*, issued a judgment establishing facts of mass violations of the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and the unlawful displacement of civilians, which displayed elements of the crime of genocide in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine [11]. This decision became a significant precedent, laying a legal foundation for holding Russia accountable in a broader international legal context.

**Conclusions.** The study of the legal foundations for countering genocide and the mechanisms of accountability demonstrates that both international and national law contain clearly defined norms aimed at the prevention, cessation, and punishment of this gravest crime against humanity. However, practical experience shows that the effectiveness of applying these norms largely depends on states' political will, their capacity for international cooperation, the availability of evidence, and the mechanisms of jurisdictional enforcement.

In the case of Russian aggression against Ukraine, numerous facts have emerged that potentially indicate the commission of genocide against the Ukrainian people. These include mass killings

of civilians, systematic violence, the deportation of children, forced Russification, the destruction of cultural sites, and the blockade of humanitarian access to occupied territories. Such actions not only violate the norms of international humanitarian law but may also qualify as the crime of genocide under the provisions of the 1948 Convention.

Therefore, Ukraine must further strengthen its legal response system to such crimes through: improving national criminal legislation in line with international standards; effective cooperation with the International Criminal Court and other justice bodies; establishing an international tribunal to investigate the crime of aggression; systematic documentation of genocide-related facts; intensifying diplomatic efforts for the international recognition of the genocide.

The implementation of these measures will contribute not only to restoring justice but also to reinforcing the rule of law in the international order.

Prospects for Further Research. Promising areas for future scholarly inquiry include: the analysis of the role of special international tribunals in investigating crimes committed against Ukraine; the improvement of Ukrainian legislation with respect to harmonization with international criminal law; and the examination of how the legal qualification of genocide influences processes of reparations and the transformation of national memory.

Particular attention should be given to the development of mechanisms for compensating victims of genocide and documenting instances of the destruction of national groups – an effort that holds both legal and humanitarian significance. At the same time, it is essential to deepen interdisciplinary research – at the intersection of international law, political science, history, sociology, and conflict studies – in order to form a comprehensive strategy for preventing future acts of genocide.

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## **COUNTERACTING THE GENOCIDE OF PEOPLES: REALITIES WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO IGNORE**

One of the most cited aphorisms of the twentieth century - words attributed to Pastor Martin Niemöller, «First they came for the others, and I did not speak out -because I was not one of them» - today resounds not as a memory, but as a warning. It reminds us of the peril posed by indifference in the face of crimes that are systemic and intentional in nature. It is this very indifference - on the part of states, individuals, societies, and international institutions - that often creates the conditions in which genocide becomes possible or is allowed to persist.

The contemporary era is characterised by unprecedented technological progress. We live in a world that has granted humanity rapid access to artificial intelligence, global information networks, space exploration, and cutting-edge biotechnology. Yet this very world, paradoxically, still bears witness to the systematic annihilation of segments of humanity. Genocide no longer appears to be a historical anomaly; rather, it has become a structural risk within the modern geopolitical order, exposing an alarming inability - or unwillingness - to ensure the fundamental security of individuals and communities.

My personal observation of the ongoing attempt to eradicate Ukrainian identity amidst large-scale aggression reinforces a universal truth: genocide is never a spontaneous act. It is always the result of a multi-stage process that includes linguistic stigmatisation, the depersonalisation of victims, the destruction of cultural heritage, and the delegitimisation of a people's right to exist. In Ukraine's case, we are not merely dealing with war crimes, but with deliberate actions that meet core criteria of genocide: the forcible transfer of children, the dismantling of educational institutions, the elimination of cultural centres, and the persecution of linguistic identity.

However, the Ukrainian experience is not an exception in today's world. The mass extermination of the Tutsi in Rwanda, the repression of Yazidis in Iraq, the systematic persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and the tragedies faced by peoples in Sudan and Ethiopia - all reflect instances in which the international community demonstrated either incapacity or political reluctance to intervene. In many such cases, the crimes were preceded by warning signs: hate propaganda, mass detentions, and the obstruction of information. Nonetheless, the global response was often belated or merely symbolic.

These cases underscore that genocide is not solely the problem of a particular country or region. It constitutes a systemic challenge to the global humanitarian order. In a world where public attention is fleeting and institutional memory is fragmented, genocide is perpetrated not only through violence but also through indifference - be it political, informational, or moral. It is this very indifference that enables the repetition of scenarios that should have been deemed impossible after the Holocaust.

Simultaneously, there exists a counter-trend: one of solidarity, empathy, and the mobilisation of civic initiatives. This moral response is what enables the identification of the problem and the formation of new mechanisms for action. In circumstances where states often find themselves hostage to their own interests, it is civil societies, academic communities, non-governmental organisations, and international scholarly platforms that are best positioned to become the drivers of a new ethic of response - one that is immediate, principled, and transnational.

My personal motivation is not solely emotional; it stems from a deep conviction that the modern world can no longer afford passivity. Protecting the rights of one nation serves simultaneously as the prevention of future tragedies for others. In a world where aggression is increasingly justified by geopolitical interests, only collective, solidaristic action can restore meaning to the

concepts of «dignity», «humanity», and «life». If humanity does not learn to respond to genocide systematically, it risks losing its capacity for moral reflection - and with it, its future.

At this juncture, the global community urgently requires a renewed vision of genocide prevention - one that transcends declarative rhetoric and the reactive justice of post-facto tribunals. History has demonstrated that existing international legal instruments - such as the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide - though progressive for their time, have proven insufficient in the face of contemporary hybrid threats, large-scale disinformation, and the political paralysis of international institutions.

Accordingly, there is a pressing need to initiate the establishment of a new intergovernmental and cross-sectoral mechanism - a so-called «Peace Convention of the 21st Century». Its foundational idea is the recognition that genocide in one part of the world constitutes a threat to all humanity, not only to its immediate victims. Participants in such a Convention would not be limited to states, but would include transnational organisations, research institutes, universities, municipalities, human rights networks, and faith-based communities. In doing so, a new architecture of preventive solidarity would be forged, grounded in the universal protection of the right to life, national identity, language, culture, and religion.

This Convention must articulate a clearly defined algorithm of action in response to emerging signs of genocide: the immediate public recognition of atrocity crimes, diplomatic mobilisation, the creation of international humanitarian missions for the evacuation of vulnerable populations, coordination of refugee reception, the provision of urgently needed aid, the imposition of sanctions on perpetrator states, and support for initiatives documenting crimes in real time. Particular emphasis should be placed on the preventative dimension: the early identification of dehumanisation, linguistic discrimination, bans on education, and the destruction of cultural heritage.

Participants in such an initiative would assume not only a moral obligation, but also institutional responsibility for the creation of an early response system. Specifically, within the framework of the Convention, multidisciplinary rapid-response monitoring centres could be established - based at universities, international agencies, or regional security platforms - that would operate independently of the political interests of individual states. National parliaments joining the Convention could also incorporate provisions for the automatic triggering of humanitarian intervention procedures in the event of a genocide threat.

The educational component of the Convention is equally vital. The inclusion of compulsory curricula on the nature, history, and consequences of genocide in the national education systems of participating countries would contribute to the development of a new generation of citizens - capable of recognising hate speech, attuned to discrimination, and equipped to resist its normalisation in public discourse.

This model is not a utopian construct but a rational response to the crisis of global governance and the erosion of rights boundaries. In a world where human rights violations are increasingly commodified in political bargaining, such a Convention could serve as both a moral and operational standard. Its implementation would enable the saving of lives here and now and the prevention of new catastrophes before they reach irreversible proportions.

Thus, we arrive at an instrument through which genocide prevention ceases to be a matter reserved solely for international criminal law - it becomes a subject of daily responsibility for states and individuals alike. This represents a transition from the worldview of the passive observer to that of the active protector. And it is precisely this transformation that must form the cornerstone of a new global order in which the value of human life is never subject to negotiation.

# **SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF GENOCIDE**

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## **DESTRUCTION AND RESTORATION: THE STATE OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AMID ARMED CONFLICT**

The full-scale invasion that began on February 24, 2022, has vividly demonstrated that the cultural sphere is an integral component of national security. The protection of cultural code, historical memory, and national identity is a key factor in preserving the sovereignty and dignity of the state. Care for cultural uniqueness must become a significant component of Ukraine's strategic vision for reconstruction and future development.

The deliberate destruction of centuries-old cultural monuments, looting of museums, theft of artifacts from occupied territories, and the loss of museum collections by the Russian aggressor present serious challenges for Ukrainian society. All of this requires the development of tactical and strategic approaches aimed at preserving and restoring cultural heritage. These processes must be integrated into the modern global vision of cultural value protection and supported at the international level.

War always delivers a devastating blow not only to human lives, infrastructure, and the economy but also to cultural heritage. The beginning of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, posed a significant challenge to the preservation of Ukraine's historical, architectural, religious, and cultural monuments.

The situation is especially critical in the temporarily occupied territories, where not only physical destruction is recorded but also attempts at cultural assimilation—renaming of Ukrainian places, theft of museum exhibits, and repression of bearers of Ukrainian culture.

During the full-scale invasion, Russia has destroyed and damaged 1,390 cultural heritage monuments and 2,241 cultural infrastructure objects in Ukraine,

according to the Interactive Analytical Dashboard on damaged cultural heritage sites and infrastructure. The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine continues to record crimes against Ukrainian culture. Damage has already been confirmed in 18 regions and in Kyiv. Among the affected monuments: 138 are of national significance, 1,172 of local significance, and 80 newly discovered (a visualized list is presented in Diagram 1 below).

Indeed, when cultural heritage disappears, the connection between generations is lost. People lose memory of who their ancestors were, how they lived, and what they dreamed of. The uniqueness of the nation is lost. That is precisely why the enemy seeks to destroy it —because Ukrainian culture is strong, deep, and alive.

According to data from the Interactive Analytical Dashboard on damaged cultural heritage sites and infrastructure of the State Institution «Ukrainian Center for Cultural Studies» of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine,

as of April 23, 2025, the most affected regions are: Donetsk (500), Kharkiv (357), Kherson (256), Kyiv region (173), Mykolaiv (165), and Sumy (141) (visualized in Figure 2).




Diagram 1: Visualized number of damaged monuments

*Interaktyvna analitychna panel shchodo poshkodzhennykh ob'ektiv kulturnoi spadshchyny ta infrastruktury Derzhavnoi ustanovy «Ukrainskyi tsentr kulturnykh doslidzhen» Ministerstva kultury ta stratehichnykh komunikatsii Ukrainy*



Figure 2: Visualized number of damaged cultural infrastructure objects

*Interaktyvna analitychna panel shchodo poshkodzhennykh ob'ektiv kulturnoi spadshchyny ta infrastruktury Derzhavnoi ustanovy «Ukrainskyi tsentr kulturnykh doslidzhen» Ministerstva kultury ta stratehichnykh komunikatsii Ukrainy*

In total, cultural heritage sites were damaged in 20 regions and in Kyiv, including: Donetsk – 500, Kharkiv – 357, Kherson – 256, Kyiv region – 173, Mykolaiv – 165, Sumy – 141, Zaporizhzhia – 139, Luhansk – 132, Chernihiv – 108, Dnipropetrovsk – 72, Zhytomyr – 54, Khmelnytskyi – 51, Odesa – 33, Kyiv city – 24, Cherkasy – 11, Poltava – 8, Lviv – 8, Vinnytsia – 4, Kirovohrad – 3, Zakarpattia – 1 (visualized in Figure 3).



Figure 3: Regional distribution by number of damages

*The statistics are presented according to the report of 23.04.2025 on the Interactive Analytical Panel on Damaged Cultural Heritage and Infrastructure of the State Institution ‘Ukrainian Centre for Cultural Research’ of the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine (<https://lookerstudio.google.com/u/0/reporting/cf33ab9b-831d-4edc-80be-b294caae065a/page/WiDVE?hl=en&pli=1>)*

The largest group of cultural infrastructure objects that suffered damage or destruction are cultural centers (48.7% of the total number of affected cultural institutions).

In total, the following were damaged or destroyed: 1,091 cultural centers, 793 libraries (35.4%), 171 art education institutions (7.6%), 123 museums and galleries (5.5%),

42 theaters, cinemas, and philharmonics, 8 reserves, 9 parks and zoos, and 4 circuses (2.8%) (visualized in Figure and 5 ).


After the active phase of the war ends, Ukraine will face the large-scale task of implementing a comprehensive cultural heritage restoration program.

Discussions are already underway regarding future restoration work, international funding, and active involvement of professional and volunteer communities.

The focus will be not only on the physical restoration of destroyed monuments but also on the return of lost museum collections, archives, and cultural artifacts.

However, preserving cultural heritage is much more than protecting buildings, frescoes, or library collections. It is primarily about national identity, historical memory, and the symbolic foundation of statehood. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been not only an act of armed aggression but also a deliberate attempt to destroy the cultural continuity of the Ukrainian people. Thus, the fight for culture is no less important than the defense of territory –it has become a separate front in this war.


**Distribution of facilities by facility type**



**Figure 4: Distribution of facilities by type**

*The statistics are presented according to the report of 23.04.2025 on the Interactive Analytical Panel on Damaged Cultural Heritage and Infrastructure of the State Institution 'Ukrainian Centre for Cultural Research' of the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine (<https://lookerstudio.google.com/u/0/reporting/cf33ab9b-831d-4edc-80be-b294caae065a/page/WiDVE?hl=en&pli=1>)*

**Distribution of facilities by region**



**Figure 5: Distribution of facilities by region**

*The statistics are presented according to the report of 23.04.2025 on the Interactive Analytical Panel on Damaged Cultural Heritage and Infrastructure of the State Institution 'Ukrainian Centre for Cultural Research' of the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine (<https://lookerstudio.google.com/u/0/reporting/cf33ab9b-831d-4edc-80be-b294caae065a/page/WiDVE?hl=en&pli=1>)*

Despite the scale of destruction, Ukrainian scholars, volunteers, and international partners are actively working to document crimes against cultural heritage,



protect surviving objects, and plan their restoration. Yet a difficult path lies ahead, as the protection and preservation of cultural heritage remain among the most significant challenges both during and after the war.

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## **PSYCHOLOGICAL FEATURES OF THE GENOCIDE CONSEQUENCES IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN LITERATURE**

Key words: collective unconscious, archetypes, ancestral memory, transgenerational trauma, genocide, literary text, psycho-emotional experience.

Introduction. Contemporary Ukrainian fiction is increasingly acquiring the features of not only an artistic but also a psychological and socio-cultural phenomenon. It serves as a tool for comprehending complex and deeply traumatic phenomena such as genocides, repressions, and mass violence that have left an imprint on the nation's collective consciousness. Of particular value are texts that bring to the surface the deeper layers of memory, in particular those that were not personally experienced but remained in the form of subconscious experience-archetypes or intuitive knowledge. This phenomenon was studied by C. G. Jung, who noted that the collective unconscious is a source of power that preserves the experience of previous generations and manifests itself through archetypes, forms that determine human experience and behavior. At the intersection of psychology and literature, a space emerges in which the literary word not only depicts reality, but also transmits and relives traumatic experiences through generations.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the manifestations of the collective unconscious, ancestral memory, and transgenerational trauma in Ukrainian literature of recent decades as a way of comprehending the psychological consequences of the genocide. The study also seeks to show how works of fiction become a channel for the transmission of individualized, but not personally experienced, experiences.

Research results. Jung's ideas about the collective unconscious and archetypes allow us to understand more deeply the phenomenon when a work of art becomes a carrier of ancestral memory. Jung assumed the possibility of "inheriting the prerequisites for the emergence of ideas" [1], i.e. the transmission of experience, including trauma, from generation to generation. This theory is confirmed in the literature.

In 2009, O. Zabuzhko's novel *The Museum of Abandoned Secrets* was published [2], in which the character, a young man from an intelligent family named Adrian, lives in 2001 and has extremely detailed dreams. In these dreams, he is an OUN militant and later an UPA fighter nicknamed "The Beast." After being wounded in a UPA hideout (1947, the death of the insurgent army), Zvir observes how people fight against hopelessness. Along with the Beast, Heltsya (Olena Dovhanivna) is in the hideout, and Daryna Hoshchynska, Adrian's lover since 2001, is trying to find out her fate. In his dreams, Adrian finds out what happened to Olena Dovganivna, and he succeeds only thanks to his inherited experience with an individual imprint, the same one that C.G. Jung wrote about. "The Beast" through whose eyes Adrian looks later married Lina, Olena's younger sister. Although these events could not have been known to him objectively, the detailing of the dreams and the interweaving of the search for the fate of the rebel Olena Dovganivna into the plot allows us to interpret this motif as a manifestation of individual experience rooted in the collective subconscious. It is thanks to these "inherited memories" that the protagonist finds out the historical truth about his family.

Another example is Mykhailo Butchenko's novel *The Kurkul*, in which the author describes the events of the 1930s-collectivization, the exile of the Shevchenko family, and repression. In

the afterword, Butchenko admits that he was surprised more than once when he wrote scenes that seemed to “come to life” in his mind, even though he could not know them from his own experience. He directly refers to DNA as a carrier of ancestral information, which allowed him to feel part of history. This is an example of how the literary imagination activates the unconscious memory of the family, conveying traumatic experiences on an artistic level. Here is what the author himself states in the afterword: “For me, this book is a restoration of historical memory. All the events that happen to the characters turned out to be hidden, time-sealed information in my DNA. I only had to write a word once, just to start, and then the phrases began to form into figures by themselves; being born, they resurrected history.

Everything that happened to my great-grandparents is true, even though it may seem like fiction to some. Sometimes I had to stop to understand why each new day came to life in me, as if it were happening to me. I can't really explain why, but it often happened that I was as surprised by the facts described in the book as my reader, probably, was. It seems to me that ancestral memory is a powerful and not quite analyzed thing. It is this memory that changes and explains a lot of things, remaining alive and dead at the same time. We need to look into the past more than once to predict the future. This is the simplest and most difficult task, but it is so necessary for the country.” [3, 251].

A poetic comprehension of the theme of preserving unconscious ancestral memory can be seen in Maria Morozenko's poem “From the Past” [4], published at the end of 2019. The lyrical heroine speaks of a sense of repetition-as if she had already lived in those places, had already seen those events, although she has no such memories at the level of consciousness. The poem conveys an intuitive sense of connection with ancestors, with places that were not the object of personal experience, but are emotionally read as close. Through the emotional images of the poem, it becomes possible to realize the unconscious knowledge preserved in the memory of generations.

Thus, the mechanisms of transgenerational trauma transmission can be clearly traced in the artistic discourse. Literary texts become not just a reconstruction of the past, but a living experience of it-through symbols, archetypes, dreams, and a sense of déjà vu. The collective unconscious manifests itself in the form of familiar structures, emotions, and reactions that the characters of the works experience despite the time distance.

Conclusions. Contemporary Ukrainian literature actively interacts with the themes of national trauma, continuity of experience, and preservation of historical memory. In particular, literary texts become carriers of unconscious knowledge that is passed down through generations. The collective unconscious described by Jung finds its artistic embodiment in works that demonstrate an intuitive reproduction of historical events that were not directly experienced. This is especially important for comprehending the consequences of genocide and mass repression, which left a deep imprint on the nation's psyche.

In examples from Ukrainian prose and poetry, we observe how the archetypes of struggle, loss, and survival, as well as images from family history, become the basis for stories that resonate with the collective memory of the people. In this context, literature becomes a tool not only for artistic comprehension but also for psychological treatment of trauma, its articulation, and transmission to future generations.

Perspectives for further research. Further study of the phenomenon of the collective unconscious in literature can be based on an interdisciplinary approach, involving knowledge of neuropsychology, genetics, psychoanalysis, and cultural studies. Particularly promising is the analysis of the relationship between transgenerational memory and narrative structures in prose, as well as the study of artistic mechanisms for transmitting ancestral memory in drama and cinema. It is also worth investigating how these processes affect the formation of national identity and the perception of historical truth by younger generations.

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## **SOCIOCULTURAL TRAUMA OF GENOCIDE AND ITS OVERCOMING THROUGH EDUCATION: THE UKRAINIAN CONTEXT**

The phenomenon of sociocultural trauma caused by genocidal practices directed against the Ukrainian people throughout the 20th and 21st centuries is examined. A multidisciplinary analysis of the cultural, social, and psychological consequences of these events has been carried out, especially in the context of Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine. Emphasis is placed on the role of the educational system, particularly professional pre-higher education, in overcoming the consequences of genocide, restoring collective dignity, shaping the value consciousness of youth, and preventing the recurrence of such crimes in the future.

**Keywords:** genocide, sociocultural trauma, historical memory, education, professional pre-higher education, national identity, Holodomor, war.

In the 20th century, the Ukrainian people experienced several waves of deliberate extermination — both in physical and cultural dimensions. The Holodomor of 1932–1933, mass repressions, deportations, forced Russification, and the elimination of the national intelligentsia were not only crimes against humanity but also attempts to erase Ukrainian identity [1, 2]. These acts of state terror encompassed large-scale campaigns of physical destruction of the peasantry as the social backbone of the Ukrainian national movement, mass arrests and executions of intellectuals, the prohibition of the Ukrainian language in education and publishing, and the eradication of historical memory through falsification of the past. According to contemporary research, millions of Ukrainians became victims of systemic violence aimed at demoralization, assimilation, or the eradication of national distinctiveness. All of this produced a profound collective trauma that remains present in the public consciousness, especially in light of the renewed challenges posed by the war of the 21st century.

In the 21st century, these brutal practices have continued under the conditions of the full-scale aggression launched by the Russian Federation, accompanied by the killing of civilians, the deportation of children, and the destruction of cultural sites and educational institutions — actions that bear the characteristics of modern genocide. According to the United Nations, as of early 2024, over 10,000 civilians, including children, had been killed as a result of military actions in Ukraine, with the number of injured exceeding 18,000. Official data from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine indicate that more than 19,000 Ukrainian children have been deported or forcibly transferred to Russia or temporarily occupied territories. Furthermore, UNESCO has recorded over 400 instances of destruction of cultural heritage sites, including museums, theaters, churches, libraries, and educational institutions. These actions exhibit clear signs of a deliberate effort to eradicate Ukrainian national identity by dismantling collective memory, language, culture, and the value foundations of the nation — acts that directly contravene international humanitarian law and the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Such phenomena generate a profound sociocultural trauma, which manifests itself at the levels of collective consciousness, cultural memory, identity, and intergenerational transmission of experience [3]. As A. Assmann notes, the memory of traumatic events does not vanish but becomes embedded in culture, transforming into narratives, symbols, and educational practices

[4]. In the Ukrainian context, these processes are particularly relevant, as society is simultaneously experiencing both historical and current wartime trauma.

In this context, education—particularly professional pre-higher education, which brings together young people from various regions—assumes the role of a social elevator and a space for shaping conscious national identity, resisting aggression, and restoring cultural security. The concept of a social elevator in this case refers to a mechanism that enhances young people’s life opportunities through access to quality education, professional qualifications, and pathways to social mobility, regardless of their social background or geographical location. This potential is realized not only through academic curricula but also through a holistic institutional environment that promotes civic engagement, personal maturity, and a sense of responsibility.

The development of such an environment approaches the model of an educational ecosystem, in which the learning space functions as an interconnected structure involving instructors, student self-government, local communities, employers, and cultural institutions (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Ecosystem-Based Structure of the Educational Environment in Professional Pre-Higher Education

Among the methods used to build such an educational ecosystem are the implementation of interdisciplinary courses, the development of service learning, project-based collaboration with local initiatives, mentoring, digital infrastructure for open access to educational resources, and the promotion of students’ psycho-emotional well-being. This approach facilitates not only the transmission of knowledge but also the formation of an active, nationally conscious citizen capable of adapting to contemporary challenges and addressing the consequences of sociocultural trauma.

It is important not only to recall the facts of genocide but also to critically engage with them through educational curricula, fostering critical thinking, the capacity for historical reflection, and ethical evaluation of past events [5] (Table 1).

Table 1

Methods of Overcoming the Sociocultural Trauma of Genocide through Educational Means

Domain	Method	Content / Examples of Implementation
Educational	Integration of genocide-related topics into curricula	Teaching about the Holodomor, repressions, and deportations in history, civic education, cultural studies, and law courses

	Interdisciplinary approach	Coordinated coverage of genocide topics through literature, psychology, and sociology
	Development of critical thinking	Source analysis, discussions, and reflection on genocide events and their consequences
Project-based	Student project activities	Collecting family histories, creating digital memory archives, and implementing local memorial initiatives
	Creation of a safe educational space	Platforms for discussing traumatic experiences and collaborative work on historical memory
Psychological support	Education on trauma coping mechanisms	Knowledge of emotional reactions, processing of loss, fear, and confusion
	Psychological support within the educational environment	Involvement of professional psychologists, thematic sessions, and training programs
	Art therapy practices	Work with visual art, literary creativity, and music as means of expressing and transforming experience
Civic and value-based	Formation of national identity	Understanding shared history, restoring collective dignity, and recognizing generational continuity
	Fostering ethical stance and civic responsibility	Awareness of the values of freedom, dignity, and prevention of crimes against humanity

The methods of overcoming the sociocultural trauma of genocide, summarized in Table 1, reflect a systematic and interdisciplinary approach to shaping a comprehensive educational policy aimed at understanding traumatic historical experiences and transforming them into a resource for social cohesion and resilience. The structure of the table clearly outlines four key domains: educational, project-based, psychological support, and civic-value-oriented. Each of these domains is focused not only on informing learners about genocide but also on actively involving students in the processes of reinterpretation, emotional processing, and collective articulation of historical trauma.

Within the educational process, particular importance is given to the integration of genocide-related content into academic courses, particularly those in history, civic education, cultural studies, law, and psychology. As emphasized in the main text, it is not sufficient to simply present factual information; it is essential to engage students in interdisciplinary analysis, critical thinking, and ethical reflection. Table 1 highlights the effectiveness of this interdisciplinary approach, which enhances the emotional and value-based perception of the topic and broadens the understanding of its societal significance.

The project-based component, which includes documenting family histories, creating digital memory archives, and implementing memorial initiatives, represents a form of active engagement with collective memory. Involving young people in such activities contributes to the personalization of historical experience, the development of empathy, and a sense of responsibility toward the past. In this sense, project-based work serves not only an educational function but also a therapeutic one, helping to overcome detachment from traumatic narratives.

Equally important is the psychological support component, which Table 1 identifies as a necessary condition for effective educational impact in the context of collective trauma. This involves creating a safe space for emotional expression, collaboration with psychologists, and the use of art therapy techniques that facilitate the gradual processing of fear, loss, and uncertainty.

In this regard, education functions not only as a means of instruction but also as a form of healing — providing a supportive environment where the experiences of the past are not repressed but consciously addressed and transformed.

Ultimately, the civic and value-based component is directed toward the development of national identity, the cultivation of historical memory, and the formation of an active civic stance oriented toward the defense of democratic values, freedom, and human dignity. As emphasized in the concluding part of the text, the lessons of the past must not remain purely theoretical—they should contribute to the formation of individuals capable of acting in the face of historical challenges. Accordingly, the table presented above not only outlines the primary methods of addressing trauma through education but also affirms the need for a comprehensive and holistic educational approach under the conditions of modern warfare and the urgent demand for national unity.

In this context, it is equally important to turn to active forms of youth engagement, particularly through the implementation of innovative educational technologies and didactic strategies.

One of the promising pedagogical strategies for addressing the sociocultural trauma caused by genocide is problem-based learning. This approach involves engaging students of professional pre-higher education in the formulation, analysis, and resolution of complex, open-ended problems directly related to historical memory, national identity, and the interpretation of traumatic experience.

Examples of learning problems that may serve as catalysts for critical thinking and discussion include:

- How can the memory of genocide be preserved and passed on to future generations in the context of digital culture and information warfare?
- In what ways does genocide affect national identity, and how can education contribute to its restoration?
- How can collective trauma be discussed within the student community without reinforcing feelings of victimhood or fear?
- What ethical challenges arise in the process of documenting personal and family stories of violence?

To address these problems, the following methods are proposed:

1. Historical research projects: engaging students in collecting oral testimonies, analyzing archival materials, and creating digital exhibitions of memory.
2. Interdisciplinary seminars: integrating knowledge from history, ethics, psychology, and sociology to support a comprehensive understanding of national experience.
3. Simulation-based role-playing: modeling civic decision-making in the context of commemorating victims, reconciliation, or transitional justice.
4. Reflective essays and dialogic discussions: encouraging students to process emotional reactions, confront moral dilemmas, and develop their own viewpoints.
5. Collaborative digital storytelling: producing multimedia narratives that combine factual data, testimonies, and personal interpretations of historical events.

Problem-based learning in this context not only fosters critical thinking and civic engagement but also contributes to the development of empathy and resilience, enabling learners to process inherited trauma in a constructive way.

The question of remembering the genocide of the Ukrainian people is not solely the concern of historians; it is a challenge for the entire modern Ukrainian educational system. The lessons of the past must not remain purely theoretical. They should shape civic consciousness and a readiness to defend the values of humanity, freedom, and justice. Education itself serves as the foundation on which societal unity can be restored, national statehood preserved, trauma overcome, and future crimes against humanity prevented.



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## **MUSIC AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RESISTANCE AND UNITY IN THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR SINCE 2022**

**Keywords:** musical art, contemporary performers, instrument of resistance and unity.

Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was a tragedy that destroyed cities, claimed tens of thousands of lives, and forced hundreds of thousands to flee their homes. In these circumstances, music has ceased to be just a hobby or a comfort – it has become a weapon of cultural resistance, helping to preserve national identity, maintain the spirit of struggle, and convey the truth to the world. From the very first days of the war, Ukrainian musicians used their talents to create songs that became symbols of resilience.

The activities of musicians are presented in the works of Ukrainian researchers. The songwriting of Ukrainian artists during the war was studied by Yulia Antypenko and Veronika Levko [1]. The transformation processes of rock music in the context of the war in Ukraine are revealed in the work of Vyacheslav Ovsyannikov [2].

The purpose of the work is to study examples of singers and musicians who demonstrate how the war, despite the pain, gives impetus to the establishment of the Ukrainian nation.

One of the most striking examples is «Oh, in the meadow is a red viburnum,» a song with roots in the 17th century that was the anthem of the Sich Riflemen in 1914. The words and music were written by Stepan Charnetskyi. In 2022, Andriy Khlyvnyuk, the leader of the band BoomBox, performed it on St. Sophia Square in Kyiv, which was surrounded by the enemy. This moment, filmed on a phone, went viral, and a remix by Pink Floyd called «Hey, Hey, Rise Up!» garnered millions of plays, making the red viburnum, which represents blood and rebirth, a symbol of Ukrainian resistance. This song seemed to open the door to other works that personified the spirit of struggle.

The song «Stefania» by Kalush Orchestra has become another anthem of resilience. Written as a dedication to the mother of the band's leader, Oleh Psyuk, it won the Eurovision Song Contest in 2022, and its lines about returning home despite the destroyed roads resonated with millions. During his performance, Psyuk called for the salvation of Mariupol and Azovstal, turning the stage into a platform for peace. These songs, heard from the frontline to international arenas, became a bridge connecting Ukrainians to the global community, showing how music can be the voice of a nation.

These songs were born thanks to artists who not only created music but also took an active part in the struggle. Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, the leader of the band Okean Elzy, created the song «City of Mary» (2022), dedicated to the defenders of Mariupol. Its melody, full of pain and dignity, became a requiem for the dead and a call to resistance. His composition «Not Your War» (2015), written after the annexation of Crimea, gained popularity again in 2022, often used in videos about the war, including Mariupol. Svyatoslav Vakarchuk did not limit himself to the studio – he regularly performed for the military at the front, in hot spots, and for refugees at train stations, reminding them that music can be a source of strength.

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Along with direct support at the front, Ukrainian musicians also waged a cultural struggle, rejecting Russian-language content and promoting the Ukrainian language. This cultural resistance became an important part of the overall struggle for national identity and independence.

Another striking example of patriotism is the work of Tina Karol, People's Artist of Ukraine, who has been actively supporting Ukraine's statehood since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. She opened an information resistance center in Poland, held rallies and participated in charity concerts. Tina Karol publicly criticizes Ukrainian artists who continued to tour Russia after 2014, reminding them of the importance of dignity and unity in difficult times. She has also adapted her Russian-language hits into Ukrainian, part of a broader movement among Ukrainian stars.

Even in war zones, music is a voice of hope. In Kharkiv, violinist Vira Lytovchenko organized concerts in a basement where people were hiding from shelling, playing Vivaldi and Ukrainian melodies. In another city, in Lviv, pianist Oleksiy Karpenko performed Hans Zimmer to the sound of a siren. This recording went viral, thanks to Hans Zimmer, who showed the video at one of his concerts in London. There are many examples like this, and these performances by artists in the heart of war illustrate how music helps preserve humanity.

The activities of artists at the front and in the home front found a response abroad, where Ukrainian musicians used their talents to raise support for Ukraine. The BoomBox band held charity tours in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Croatia to raise funds for the purchase of drones, cars, and protective equipment for the army. Kalush Orchestra and Tina Karol performed at international festivals such as Glastonbury, raising millions of hryvnias for humanitarian aid. The Ukrainian Freedom Orchestra toured prestigious venues from London to New York, telling the story of the war.

Many musicians switched to a model of performing for donations, refusing to receive royalties. All contributions were directed to military needs, which showed how music was an instrument of material resistance. For example, impromptu tours organized by Kostyantyn Pochtar even took place in private homes to raise funds for the victims. International bands such as Maneskin, Rammstein, Imagine Dragons, Scorpions, Coldplay and others supported Ukraine by displaying Ukrainian flags at their concerts. These efforts demonstrated how music unites the global community around the Ukrainian struggle.

Such global support is closely linked to the flourishing of the Ukrainian music industry, which the war, despite the tragedy, has stimulated. Since 2022, new artists have been gaining popularity thanks to Ukrainian-language tracks that combine modern genres with national motifs. This flourishing has become part of a cultural resistance aimed at asserting national identity and at the same time a reflection of how war inspires creativity.

In times of war, music goes beyond art and becomes a universal language that unites people, inspires them to fight and keeps them hopeful. It gives voice to those who resist aggression, supports those who defend their land, and reminds the world of the value of freedom. Through creativity, performances, and charity, Ukrainian musicians have shown that music can be not only a reflection of a nation's spirit, but also a force for its revival. In the darkest of times, melodies become a symbol of resilience that reverberates far beyond borders.

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# **INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, DIPLOMACY, AND INFORMATION POLICY IN COUNTERACTING GENOCIDE**

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## **INFORMATION POLICY AS A TOOL FOR COUNTERING GENOCIDAL INTENTIONS: CYBERSECURITY OF UKRAINE UNDER CONDITIONS OF RUSSIAN HYBRID AGGRESSION**

Modern warfare extends far beyond traditional armed confrontation. Cyberspace has become a new front where attacks on critical infrastructure, information space, and military control systems take place. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, cyber threats play a key role, creating new challenges for Ukraine's national security. As M.V. Bilousov notes in his work, Russia's hybrid war is aimed not only at physical objects but also at cyberspace, which constitutes part of a systematic campaign to eliminate Ukrainian identity and statehood, corresponding to the characteristics of genocide according to international law [1, p. 120]. Targeted cyber attacks on civilian infrastructure facilities, particularly energy and water supply systems, combined with information operations to dehumanize Ukrainians, are an integral component of the Russian strategy aimed at creating conditions incompatible with life for a significant portion of the Ukrainian population.

Cyber attacks are an integral part of hybrid warfare as they allow the aggressor to influence the opponent without direct physical invasion. Russia systematically uses cyber attacks against Ukraine as an instrument of genocide, conducting DDoS attacks on government and military resources, breaking into operational control systems, and stealing confidential information [2, p. 17]. Particularly threatening to the survival of the Ukrainian people are attacks on critical infrastructure such as power grids, banks, and transportation systems, which can paralyze the functioning of government agencies, deprive the civilian population of basic needs, and reduce the effectiveness of protection against the aggressor's genocidal actions [3, p. 22].

One of the most extensive attacks was the cyber attack on the company «Ukrenergo» in 2016, which led to the temporary power outage in parts of Ukraine. This attack was linked to the Russian hacker group Sandworm. Also, in 2017, there was a cyber attack with the NotPetya virus, which paralyzed the operation of Ukrainian banks, government institutions, and enterprises. According to estimates, this attack caused multi-million dollar damages not only in Ukraine but worldwide [4, p. 160].

In parallel, the informational component of genocide is conducted through the spread of fake news, manipulation of public opinion, and the use of propaganda campaigns that deny Ukrainians' right to exist as a separate nation. The main instruments of such operations are Telegram channels, bots, and anonymous accounts that spread dehumanizing narratives about Ukrainians, demoralize the population, and sow panic, creating an informational foundation for the physical destruction of the Ukrainian people. A notable example is the operation «Secondary Infektion,» aimed at discrediting Ukrainian leadership through social platforms. Social networks also play an important

role in coordinating hacker attacks, through which volunteer groups and the IT Army of Ukraine operate. Thanks to big data technologies, analyses of cyberspace vulnerabilities are conducted, allowing for more effective responses to threats [5, p. 8].

An important method of countering genocidal cyber aggression is government initiatives aimed at developing effective legislative regulation of cyberspace, strengthening cooperation with international partners such as NATO and the EU, and developing specialized cybersecurity units within the Armed Forces of Ukraine to protect against the destruction of the Ukrainian people [6]. A significant role in ensuring cybersecurity and countering genocide is played by the private sector and volunteer initiatives engaged in threat monitoring, developing protection systems, and collecting OSINT data to counter the informational components of Russia's genocidal policy. The use of artificial intelligence and big data analysis algorithms allows for effective tracking of genocidal intentions and dangerous cyber operations, preventing possible attacks on Ukrainian life-sustaining systems [7].

An important direction in protection against genocide is training military personnel and civilians in digital security, implementing methods for verifying information, and strengthening control over the spread of disinformation that justifies the destruction of the Ukrainian nation. Ukraine is actively working to increase the level of cyber awareness by creating educational courses and cooperating with international cybersecurity organizations, such as NATO CCDCOE (Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence), including training in recognizing genocidal narratives.

Hybrid warfare requires a new approach to cybersecurity as a component of protection against genocide. Ukraine continues to strengthen its digital defense through a comprehensive approach that includes government initiatives, public activity, and international cooperation in countering genocide. Integration of the latest technologies, development of cyber defense systems, and cultivation of information security culture among the population remain important as key elements in preserving the Ukrainian people from systematic destruction.

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## **INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AS A FACTOR IN UKRAINE'S ECONOMIC REVIVAL**

Ukraine's economic recovery is an exceptionally complex, yet essential, process. The scale of destroyed infrastructure and losses in industry, agriculture, energy, and the social sphere requires colossal efforts that no single state can undertake alone. In this context, international cooperation and diplomacy become indispensable mechanisms, ensuring financial support, attracting investments, developing trade, exchanging knowledge, and coordinating efforts on a global level.

One of the most crucial directions for diplomatic work is attracting large-scale international financial assistance. Ukraine actively interacts with international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank Group. Furthermore, receiving support from individual states—particularly G7 partners, the EU, the USA, Canada, Australia, and others—is vital. Diplomatic efforts are aimed at convincing the global community of the expediency of long-term financing for Ukraine's recovery, as well as finding legal and political mechanisms for using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's benefit. A key tool in this process is the creation of special international trust funds that would guarantee transparency, efficiency, and targeted use of funds.

Equally important is the attraction of private foreign investments. Prerequisites for this include a readiness for reforms, combating corruption, ensuring the rule of law, and creating predictable conditions for business. Diplomatic work aims to disseminate information about Ukraine's potential among the international business community and to strengthen investor confidence. Special economic zones, offering preferential tax and regulatory regimes, can be beneficial, facilitating the rapid launch of production in priority economic sectors.

Another strategic direction is the restoration and development of international trade. Initiatives such as the «Solidarity Lanes» with the EU [1] have already proven effective in ensuring unhindered export of Ukrainian products. It is also crucial to modernize transport infrastructure, restore destroyed logistics routes, and create new ones to ensure the competitiveness of Ukrainian goods in global markets.

International cooperation also plays a significant role in attracting expert knowledge, technologies, and innovations. Exchanging experience with leading world economies helps Ukraine implement best practices in management, recovery planning, and the modernization of key economic sectors. Engaging foreign companies in the restoration of energy, industry, IT, and agriculture not only allows for rebuilding what was destroyed but also doing so at a modern technological level. Equally important is the development of human capital through educational and scientific programs in collaboration with international partners.

Supporting European integration processes is not only a political goal but also an economic prerequisite for Ukraine's sustainable development. Accelerating the process of accession to the European Union creates new opportunities for economic growth, attracting investment, access to the single market, and participation in European programs. Harmonizing Ukrainian legislation with European standards allows for ensuring high regulatory standards, transparency of the business environment, and stability for investors.

Additionally, it is appropriate to dwell on several other important aspects, such as humanitarian demining and restoring the security environment, as the large-scale contamination of Ukrainian territory with explosive ordnance poses a serious threat to public safety and impedes economic activity, especially in agriculture and construction. International cooperation in this area, including technical assistance, equipment, and specialist training, is critically important for creating safe conditions for people's return and economic recovery. Diplomatic efforts are aimed at involving international organizations and partner countries in demining programs and providing appropriate assistance.

No less important is the restoration of critical infrastructure, as the destruction of energy, transport, communication, and social infrastructure has caused enormous damage to the Ukrainian economy. International financial and technical assistance is necessary for the rapid recovery of these sectors, including the reconstruction of bridges, roads, railways, power plants, transmission lines, water supply and sewerage systems, as well as social infrastructure facilities (hospitals, schools, kindergartens). The involvement of foreign companies with relevant experience and technologies can significantly accelerate this process.

Special attention should be paid to supporting small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), which play an important role in creating jobs and ensuring economic growth. The economic genocide [2] by Russia has dealt a significant blow to this sector. Therefore, international SMB support programs, including grants, preferential loans, consulting services, and assistance in entering new markets, are crucial for its recovery and development. Diplomatic efforts are aimed at involving international organizations and funds in the implementation of such programs.

Environmental recovery and green transition are also important aspects, as the war has led to significant environmental damage. Restoring environmental safety and promoting a green transition are crucial aspects of Ukraine's long-term economic development. International cooperation in this area may include technology exchange, attracting investments in renewable energy projects and environmentally friendly technologies, and supporting the development and implementation of environmental standards. Diplomatic efforts are aimed at integrating environmental aspects into recovery plans and attracting international assistance for the implementation of relevant projects.

Continuing the discussion of the multifaceted role of international cooperation and diplomacy in the context of Ukraine's economic recovery, it is worth emphasizing the importance of inter-parliamentary diplomacy. Parliaments of partner countries play an important role in shaping public opinion, supporting government initiatives to assist Ukraine, and adopting relevant legislation. Active dialogue between Ukrainian parliamentarians and their counterparts from other countries contributes to strengthening bilateral relations, exchanging experience, and coordinating efforts in the field of economic support and recovery.

Equally important is the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society at both national and international levels in the recovery process. NGOs often have a deep understanding of local needs and can effectively facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid, implement community-level recovery projects, and monitor the use of international assistance. International partners' support for Ukrainian NGOs and the creation of favorable conditions for their activities are important elements of ensuring inclusive and sustainable recovery. Diplomatic efforts should be aimed at establishing effective interaction between government structures, international organizations, and civil society.

The role of cultural diplomacy in Ukraine's economic recovery deserves separate attention. Promoting Ukrainian culture abroad, supporting cultural exchanges, and artistic initiatives contribute to forming a positive image of Ukraine as a country with a rich history and cultural heritage. This contributes to attracting tourists, investments, and developing international economic ties in the long term. In addition, cultural projects also provide impetus for the psychological recovery of society and the strengthening of national identity.

In the context of economic recovery, it is also important to consider regional specifics and the needs of different regions of Ukraine, which have suffered from the war to varying degrees.

International assistance programs should be flexible and adapted to the specific needs of each region, taking into account its economic potential and recovery priorities. Diplomatic efforts should be aimed at attracting international partners to support specific regional initiatives and projects.

An important aspect is also communication with the international community regarding progress in recovery and existing needs. Regular and transparent informing about Ukraine's achievements, problems, and priorities contributes to continued international support. Using various communication channels, including public speeches, press conferences, social media, and cultural events, is important for maintaining constant interest and involvement of international partners.

It is also appropriate to emphasize the importance of long-term strategic partnership, as economic recovery is not a one-time action but a prolonged process that requires sustained support and consistent policies from international partners. One important aspect of such long-term partnership is the creation of effective mechanisms for monitoring and controlling the use of aid provided. Transparency and accountability are critically important for maintaining the trust of international donors and ensuring that funds are used effectively and for their intended purpose. Involving independent international auditing organizations and civil society representatives in control processes can increase the level of trust and ensure proper use of resources.

International cooperation should be aimed at promoting innovative development and technological modernization of the Ukrainian economy. Attracting foreign investment in high-tech sectors, supporting research and development, and exchanging knowledge and technologies can accelerate the development of the Ukrainian economy, increase its competitiveness in the global market, and create new jobs with high added value.

Regional cooperation also plays an important role in the recovery process. Developing economic ties with neighboring countries, participating in regional economic initiatives, and creating joint infrastructure projects can contribute to trade recovery, attracting investment, and strengthening economic stability in the region. Active diplomatic work at the regional level is necessary to establish and maintain such ties.

Special attention should be paid to the issue of social recovery and supporting the population affected by the war. International assistance programs in healthcare, education, psychological support, and housing are critically important for alleviating the humanitarian consequences of the war and creating conditions for the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons. Diplomatic efforts should be aimed at mobilizing resources for the implementation of such programs and ensuring their effective execution.

The prospects for Ukraine's economic recovery largely depend on the ability of the Ukrainian authorities to carry out necessary internal reforms, which include combating corruption, reforming the judicial system, deregulation of the economy, and creating a favorable business environment. Although international partners play an important role in supporting reforms through expert assistance, technical support, and financial incentives, the primary responsibility for their implementation lies directly with Ukraine.

Thus, the successful economic recovery of Ukraine after the genocide by Russia is a complex and multifaceted task that requires long-term and coordinated international cooperation at all levels. Effective diplomacy is the primary tool for attracting the necessary support, ensuring transparency and accountability, and creating favorable conditions for sustainable and inclusive economic growth. Through financial assistance, attracting investments, developing trade, exchanging knowledge, and effective coordination of efforts, Ukraine will be able to overcome the consequences of the war and build inclusive political and economic institutions based on the principles of democracy, transparency, justice, and European values..



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# ECOCIDE AS A COMPONENT OF GENOCIDE: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY

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## LEGAL NUANCES OF QUALIFYING ECOCIDE DURING WAR AS GENOCIDE UNDER PERAC PRINCIPLES

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, legal literature has increasingly discussed ecocide in the context of warfare. Public demand for accountability for military actions that destroy the environment is high. However, it should be noted that ecocide is a criminal offense that can be committed not only during wartime. Before February 24, 2022, Ukraine had opened 14 criminal proceedings for ecocide, and only 11 afterward. On April 28, 2023, prosecutors from the Specialized Environmental Prosecutor's Office of the Office of the Prosecutor General submitted the first indictment for ecocide (Article 441 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) to the court. The case involved water pollution by a large private enterprise in the Khmelnytskyi region, which produces cardboard and paper products, implicating two officials. On April 17, 2025, a verdict was reached in this case. The charges were reclassified to Article 242 of the Criminal Code (water pollution) after the court agreed with the defendants' lawyers that they had no intent to destroy the environment but merely discharged untreated wastewater into a river.

Let us compare the elements of crimes under the Criminal Code of Ukraine for genocide and ecocide.

Ecocide Art. 441 CCU/ Genocide Art. 442 CCU	mass destruction of flora	mass destruction of fauna	poisoning of the atmosphere	poisoning of water resources	taking actions that may cause an environmental disaster
1) Killing members of a group			+	+	+
2) Causing serious harm to members of a group	+	+	+	+	+
3) Imposing living conditions intended to destroy the group			+	+	+
4) Imposing measures to prevent births within the group			+	+	+

5) Forcibly transferring children from one group to another					
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As we can see, the elements partially overlap, and actions classified as ecocide can have consequences described in the genocide offense. When ecocide is deliberately used to destroy the living conditions of a specific group (e.g., poisoning water, burning land, disrupting ecosystems on which a community depends), it becomes a tool of genocide. History contains examples of ecocide in genocide:

- U.S. bombings in Vietnam (Agent Orange) – the use of defoliants to destroy jungles, leading to mass illnesses and population decline.
- Burning of Kuwaiti oil wells (1991) – Iraq set oil fields ablaze to harm civilians and cause ecological damage.
- The Russo-Ukrainian War – the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, burning of Ukrainian lands and forests, pollution of air and water due to shelling—all of which can be considered ecocide aimed at destroying Ukrainians’ livelihoods.

The societal importance of ecocide lies in its undermining of entire nations’ existence (e.g., indigenous peoples dependent on nature), leading to forced migration, famine, and disease—consequences similar to classic genocide. Without accountability for ecocide, genocidal regimes continue using the environment as a weapon.

Ecocide can be considered a component of genocide when it is part of a deliberate strategy to destroy a group by depriving them of natural resources, poisoning them, or making their environment uninhabitable. This is especially relevant in modern warfare, where the environment becomes a battleground.

Under Ukraine’s Civil Protection Code, a disaster is defined as a large-scale accident or event leading to severe consequences and constituting an emergency. The Classifier of Emergencies (DK 019:2010) defines wartime emergencies as those that disrupt normal living conditions due to conventional or mass destruction weapons, including secondary effects on populations.

International Regulation

At the international level, ecocide is understood as «violating the prohibition on deliberately causing large-scale, long-term, and severe environmental harm.» It is recognized by:

- The 1976 UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD).
- Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions (Article 35 prohibits warfare causing widespread, long-term environmental damage).
- The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), under Article 8(2)(b)(iv), criminalizes intentional attacks causing severe environmental harm. Ukraine ratified the Rome Statute on August 21, 2024, and it entered into force on January 1, 2025. The ICC has an open investigation into war crimes in Ukraine since 2013.

Principles for the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (PERAC)

The 2009 UNEP report initiated the development of PERAC, which was later refined by the UN International Law Commission. These principles establish minimum environmental standards for military and non-state actors during conflicts.

Key PERAC principles:

1. General Obligations
  - o States must comply with international law (humanitarian, environmental, human rights) to protect the environment during conflicts (Principle 1).
  - o The precautionary principle applies even without full scientific certainty (Principle 2).
2. Environmental Protection During War
  - o Prohibits intentional environmental destruction as a warfare method (Principle 5).

- o Requires post-conflict environmental restoration (Principle 6).
- 3. Post-War Mechanisms
  - o States must compensate for environmental damage (Principle 10).
  - o Information on environmental risks (e.g., toxic waste sites) must be shared (Principle 11).
- 4. Special Categories
  - o Protection of high-risk facilities (e.g., dams, nuclear plants) (Principle 13).
  - o Respect for indigenous peoples' rights (Principle 16).

While PERAC does not use the term «ecocide,» its principles effectively criminalize actions meeting ecocide criteria (mass environmental destruction with severe human consequences). For example:

- The Kakhovka HPP destruction (2023) violates Principle 5 (prohibition on intentional destruction) and Principle 13 (protection of hazardous sites).
  - o The case of Black Sea dolphins (2022) dying as a result of military operations violates Principle 1 (States must comply with international law (humanitarian, environmental, human rights) to protect the environment during conflicts and Principle 2 the precautionary principle applies even without full scientific certainty).

For international legal qualification, Ukraine must harmonize its application of ecocide and genocide provisions in peacetime and wartime. The April 17, 2025, verdict in Case No. 681/571/23 sets an important precedent for holding Russia accountable.

The issue of bringing to justice those responsible for ecocide in Ukraine due to the war requires further developments in this area and the search for the right legal models and constructions. The harmonisation of national and international criteria for the crime of ecocide is possible through the development of tools for applying the PERAC principles.

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# **EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC FRONT IN HIGHLIGHTING AND COUNTERACTING GENOCIDE**

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## **PRACTICE-ORIENTED FORMATION OF FUTURE TEACHERS' READINESS FOR PATRIOTIC EDUCATION OF YOUTH AS A TOOL TO COUNTERACT THE GENOCIDE OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE**

Today, the topic is relevant, important, and painful, and it resonates deeply with the current realities of our country. In the context of unprecedented aggression that carries horrific signs of genocide against the Ukrainian people, the issue of educating the younger generation is of particular and vital importance.

The tragic pages of our history - the Holodomor, political repression, and deportations - are undeniable evidence of the centuries-long struggle of Ukrainians for their identity and independence. Today, Ukrainians are once again witnessing an attempt to destroy our nation, our culture, and our statehood. That is why the formation of a deep sense of patriotism, awareness of their own history, the ability to think critically and resist disinformation among young people is not just a pedagogical task, but an urgent need for national security [1].

In the context of the ongoing Russian aggression, which carries signs of genocide, the issue of educating the younger generation in the spirit of patriotism, deep respect for their own history and culture, and the ability to resist disinformation and manipulation is becoming particularly acute [2]. It is the teacher, as a key figure in the educational process, who plays a crucial role in shaping these qualities in young people.

The relevance of the problem is due not only to the tragic events of the past, such as the Holodomor, political repression, and deportations, but also to the current reality, where the Ukrainian people are once again faced with a brutal attempt to destroy their identity, culture, and statehood.

The aggressor's deliberate actions aimed at destroying national memory, imposing alien narratives, killing civilians, and deporting children are nothing more than manifestations of genocidal policy [3]. In this context, patriotic education is no longer just a formal element of the educational process, but becomes an urgent need, an instrument of national security and preservation of Ukraine's future.

The purpose of this essay is to present modern understanding of patriotism that goes far beyond simple love for the Motherland.

The modern understanding of patriotism in Ukraine has evolved significantly, especially under the influence of tragic events in history and ongoing Russian aggression. It is no longer limited to the emotional feeling of love for the Motherland, but includes a much broader range of meanings and practical manifestations.

Here are the key aspects of the modern understanding of patriotism in the Ukrainian context, and we will present them in the form of a table for ease of perception.

Thus, the modern understanding of patriotism in Ukraine is a multifaceted phenomenon that includes love for the Motherland, a deep awareness of national identity, active citizenship, respect for the law, critical thinking, readiness to defend and practical activities for the benefit of the

country. In times of war, this understanding becomes especially acute and becomes the foundation of national resilience and the fight for the future.

Table 1

The main aspects of the modern understanding of patriotism

No. s/n	An aspect of the modern understanding of patriotism	Description.
1	Active citizenship	Patriotism today is not passive contemplation, but active participation in the life of the country and a willingness to take responsibility for its future. This is manifested in volunteering, supporting the army, participating in public initiatives, and working honestly for the benefit of the state.
2	Awareness of national identity	Modern patriotism is based on a deep understanding of one's own history, culture, language, and traditions. This includes honoring the heroic past, preserving cultural heritage and resisting attempts to distort or destroy it.
3	Respect for state institutions and laws	A patriot respects the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, supports state institutions, and contributes to their strengthening and development
4	Critical thinking and media literacy	In an information war, it is extremely important to be able to critically analyze information, distinguish truth from fake news, and resist propaganda and manipulation. A true patriot does not succumb to provocations and consciously forms his or her own opinion
5	Tolerance and respect for diversity	Modern Ukrainian patriotism is inclusive and open. It implies respect for the rights and freedoms of all Ukrainian citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, language of communication, religious beliefs or other characteristics.
6	Readiness to defend the homeland	In times of war, this is one of the most important manifestations of patriotism. Willingness to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, both with arms and by supporting defense from the rear.
7	Unity and solidarity	Patriotism today is an awareness of the unity of the Ukrainian people, a willingness to support each other in difficult times, and to unite to achieve a common goal - the prosperity of a free and independent Ukraine.
8	Practical activities for the benefit of the country	Modern patriotism is manifested not only in words, but also in concrete actions aimed at developing the economy, science, culture, education, and improving the well-being of citizens.

Today, patriotism includes an active civic position, awareness of one's rights and responsibilities, respect for the law, readiness to protect national interests, critical thinking, and the ability to engage in intercultural dialogue [4].

The understanding of genocide as a crime against humanity aimed at the destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group is key to understanding the scale of the threat facing the Ukrainian people [5].

In this context, patriotic education is a powerful tool for countering this, as it shapes national consciousness, strengthens the sense of unity and community, promotes the preservation of historical memory and its transmission to future generations, and fosters readiness to resist any attempts to destroy national identity.

An analysis of the shortcomings of traditional approaches to patriotic education often reveals their formality, declarativeness, and disconnection from the real needs of today. Activities limited to «Independence Day» events or memorization of poetry often do not form deep and lasting patriotic beliefs. Future educators who do not receive proper practical training may feel confused and unsure of how to effectively convey to young people the importance of patriotism in times of war and information aggression. That is why there is an urgent need to introduce practice-oriented approaches to building the readiness of future teachers.

These approaches include:

- Updating the curricula of pedagogical institutions by integrating in-depth knowledge of Ukraine's history, including periods of genocide, the struggle for independence, modern hybrid threats, and methods of countering disinformation.
- Active use of interactive teaching methods, such as empathy and critical thinking trainings, simulation games, project activities, and workshops that model real-life pedagogical situations and promote the development of practical skills in patriotic education.
- Involvement of experts and practitioners in the educational process - historians, human rights activists, veterans, representatives of NGOs with direct experience in patriotic education and countering information warfare.
- Special methods aimed at developing empathy and critical thinking in future teachers, which will allow them to work effectively with students' traumatic experiences and teach them to analyze information from different sources and distinguish truth from fakes.
- Creating conditions for the development of leadership skills and civic responsibility among students of pedagogical specialties through involvement in volunteer projects, public initiatives, and student government.
- Active use of modern technologies and digital tools to create interesting and relevant educational content on patriotic education.
- Ensuring high-quality pedagogical practice in educational institutions, where future teachers will be able to apply the acquired knowledge and skills under the guidance of experienced mentors, receiving feedback and improving their skills.

The implementation of these practice-oriented approaches should lead to important expected results: increasing the level of readiness of graduates of pedagogical institutions to effectively implement patriotic education of youth; strengthening national consciousness, patriotism and civic responsibility among students; formation of youth resistance to disinformation, propaganda and other destructive external influences; preservation and transmission of the historical memory of the struggle of the Ukrainian people as an important element of countering genocidal

In conclusion, the conclusions and prospects of our study emphasize that the practice-oriented formation of future teachers' readiness for patriotic education of young people is not just a pedagogical innovation, but a strategically important direction of state policy in the field of national security.

Effective training of teachers capable of instilling in the younger generation a deep sense of patriotism, national dignity and readiness to defend their homeland is a key to the resilience of Ukrainian society in the face of modern challenges and a guarantee of the irreversibility of Ukraine's European future.

Further research could be aimed at developing specific methodologies, evaluating their effectiveness, and implementing best practices in teacher education. The joint efforts of teacher education institutions, education authorities, NGOs and all stakeholders are a prerequisite for achieving this important goal.

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## **PEDAGOGICAL STRATEGIES OF EDUCATING PATRIOTIC VALUES OF FUTURE TEACHERS IN THE CONTEXT OF DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION AS A MEANS OF COUNTERACTING THE GENOCIDE OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY**

Today Ukraine is going through difficult times. In the context of a full-scale war, aggression and attempts to destroy our national identity, the issue of patriotic education is of particular, vital importance. It is the future educators who are studying in higher education institutions today who will be the ones who will shape the worldview, values and national consciousness of new generations of Ukrainians tomorrow.

Patriotism in the modern sense is not only love for the Motherland, but also a deep respect for its history, culture, and traditions, readiness to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, active citizenship, and responsibility for the future of the country. Fostering these values in future teachers is a strategic task, especially in the context of countering the enemy's genocidal intentions aimed at destroying our identity [2].

At the same time, we live in the era of digital transformation, which is radically changing approaches to education and training. Higher education can no longer exist outside the digital space. This opens up new opportunities for us, but also poses certain challenges in the field of patriotic education.

The relevance of the topic is extremely high and is due to a number of important factors, especially in the context of the current situation in Ukraine:

1. Ongoing Russian aggression and the threat of genocide: The full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation is accompanied by numerous war crimes, destruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage, attempts to impose an alien ideology and destroy Ukrainian identity. In these circumstances, patriotic education becomes a key element of national security and resistance. Formation of deep patriotic values in future teachers is critical for raising a generation capable of defending their country and resisting any form of aggression and genocide.

2. Information warfare and disinformation: Russia is actively using the information space to spread propaganda, fakes and distortion of historical facts, in particular about Ukraine. Future teachers should be not only carriers of patriotic values, but also media literate professionals who are able to critically evaluate information and teach this to their students, thus counteracting enemy propaganda.

3. Digital transformation of education: Modern higher education is undergoing rapid digitalization. The use of digital technologies opens up new opportunities for teaching and learning, but also requires a rethinking of traditional pedagogical approaches. The study of effective pedagogical strategies for fostering patriotism in the digital environment is extremely important to ensure the quality training of future teachers.

4. Preservation of national identity: In the context of globalization and information openness, the issue of preserving and strengthening national identity is of particular importance. Patriotic education provided by future teachers is an important factor in the formation of national consciousness, pride in their country and respect for its cultural heritage.

5. Training of a new generation of teachers: Future teachers should be not only experts in their subject area, but also patriots who can effectively convey their values to students, shaping their civic position and readiness to actively participate in the life of the country. Researching pedagogical strategies that contribute to this is important for modernizing the teacher education system.

6. The need to consolidate society: Teaching patriotism contributes to national unity and consolidation of society in the face of external and internal challenges. Teachers play an important role in forming a common value foundation that is the key to the sustainability and development of the Ukrainian state.

7. International context: The experience of other countries that have gone through periods of national revival or struggle for independence demonstrates the importance of systematic patriotic education. Studying and adapting this experience to Ukrainian realities can be useful for developing effective pedagogical strategies.

Given these factors, the study of pedagogical strategies for teaching patriotic values to future teachers in the context of the digital transformation of higher education is not just timely, but vital to ensure Ukraine's future, its independence and to counteract any attempts to destroy its people and culture. The results of such research will be of practical importance for modernizing teacher education and strengthening national resilience.

The analysis of scientific publications by domestic and foreign researchers has revealed insufficient coverage of the problems of creating analytics in the educational sector, especially in conditions of social instability, including martial law. This fact only emphasizes the urgency of conducting relevant research.

In recent months, the problems of higher education in Ukraine during the war have attracted considerable attention of scholars and have been studied in the works of I. Shevchuk, M. Kyrychenko, N. Muranov, I. Galon, O. Zakharov, I. Shemelynets, O. Krychivska, I. Bilous, and Z. Shatska.

Researchers U. Kohut, O. Sikora, and T. Vdovychyn study issues related to learning and teaching during the war, analyzing certain aspects of the educational process in wartime, where an asynchronous mode is inevitable. The ability to communicate and organize the educational process in an asynchronous format ensures safety conditions [1].

What pedagogical strategies can be effective in fostering patriotic values of future teachers in the context of digital transformation?

First of all, it is necessary to actively use multimedia resources. High-quality video lectures, documentaries, virtual tours of historical sites, interactive presentations can make the learning process more exciting and informative, and help future teachers to feel the spirit of Ukrainian history and culture more deeply.

Online platforms and interactive tasks play an important role. Creating forums for discussions on topical issues of patriotism, conducting online quizzes and quests, and developing joint projects aimed at exploring the heroic past and present of Ukraine will promote active student participation and the formation of their own position.

The potential of social media and online communities should not be underestimated. Organizing online flash mobs, challenges, and contests aimed at popularizing the Ukrainian language, culture, history, and symbols can be a powerful tool for engaging young people in patriotic initiatives.

Particular attention should be paid to the use of virtual and augmented reality. Creating immersive learning experiences that allow future teachers to «visit» the sites of historical events and feel the atmosphere of the past can have a deep emotional impact and contribute to better knowledge acquisition.

The development of media literacy is critically important. Future educators should be able to critically evaluate information in the online space, recognize fakes and propaganda, especially regarding the history and present of Ukraine. Teaching methods of information verification and countering disinformation is an integral part of their training.

Encouraging project-based activities and interdisciplinary approaches will allow students to

independently research important aspects of Ukrainian history and culture, using digital tools to collect, analyze, and present information. This will contribute to the development of their research competence and in-depth understanding of patriotic values.

Cooperation with civil society organizations, volunteers, and veterans is an important element. Organizing online meetings, webinars, and interviews with people who are directly defending our country, talking about its history and culture, will help to form a deep understanding of patriotism as an effective force.

However, in the context of digital transformation, the role of the teacher remains key. The teacher acts not only as a source of information, but also as a moderator, a mentor who helps students navigate the information space, form their own opinions, and realize the importance of patriotic values. For this purpose, it is necessary to constantly improve the digital competence of teachers, provide them with methodological recommendations and support.

To summarize, we can say with confidence that fostering patriotic values of future teachers in the context of the digital transformation of higher education is not just important, but strategically necessary to counteract the genocide of Ukrainian society, preserve our national identity and form a sustainable, conscious generation of citizens. The effective use of digital technologies combined with innovative pedagogical strategies opens up new opportunities to achieve this goal.

As representatives of the educational community, we bear a huge responsibility for the future of our country. And it is our ability to effectively use all available tools, including the possibilities of digital transformation, that will determine whether we will be able to raise a generation of patriots capable of protecting and building a strong, independent, and prosperous Ukraine.

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## **SYNERGY OF THE EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC FRONTS IN COUNTERING GENOCIDE**

Genocide, as the culmination of hatred and systematic violence, is not just a horrific event in history, but also a constant reminder of the fragility of human civilization and the devastating consequences of ideologies of intolerance. From the Holodomor in Ukraine to the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, the Rwandan tragedy, and many other crimes, history is replete with examples of the systematic destruction of entire groups of people based on their national, ethnic, racial, or religious affiliation [1]. The educational and scientific fronts play an invaluable role in the fight against this evil.

Educational institutions, from the school desk to the university classroom, are key in shaping the minds of future generations. Through the study of historical facts, analysis of primary sources, and eyewitness accounts, young people learn about genocides, recognize the mechanisms of their unfolding, and realize their terrible consequences [2]. The development of critical thinking, empathy, and tolerance becomes the key to society's resilience to xenophobia and discrimination.

Scientific research, in turn, provides a deep understanding of the causes, preconditions, and processes of genocide. Historians, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, and lawyers do a painstaking job of analyzing archival materials, identifying patterns and risk factors, and developing legal mechanisms to prevent and punish this crime. Their conclusions become the basis for the development of educational programs, the formation of public policy and international cooperation in the field of combating genocide [3].

Thus, the educational and scientific fronts, working in close cooperation, are a powerful force in illuminating the truth about the genocide, preserving the memory of the victims, and building a society capable of resisting hatred and violence. Their mission is not only academic or educational, but also deeply humanistic, aimed at protecting human dignity and preventing the recurrence of these terrible tragedies in the future.»

The relevance of the topic of the educational and scientific front in covering and combating genocide is extremely high and is due to a number of factors in the modern world:

1. Increased number of conflicts and violence.

Unfortunately, the beginning of the 21st century has been marked by numerous regional conflicts, ethnic cleansing and mass violence that carry the risk of genocide. Understanding the mechanisms that lead to such crimes and developing effective prevention strategies are essential.

2. Polarization of society and the spread of hatred

It is worth noting that many countries are experiencing an increase in social and political polarization, fueled by populism, xenophobia, and hate speech, including in the online space. Education and research can help identify and neutralize these destructive trends.

3. Denial and distortion of history

Today, we are witnessing attempts to deny or distort the facts of genocide, to downplay its scale, or to justify the perpetrators, a dangerous trend that undermines the memory of victims and creates the basis for future crimes. Educational and research initiatives are key to countering these attempts and preserving historical truth.

4. Lack of awareness

Unfortunately, in many societies, awareness of genocides and their consequences remains

low. Educational programs can fill these knowledge gaps and contribute to the development of informed citizenship.

5. The role of education in fostering tolerance and empathy

We believe that in the context of globalization and increasing cultural diversity, fostering tolerance, mutual understanding and empathy is critical for peaceful coexistence. Educational programs that highlight the history of different cultures and the consequences of intolerance play a key role in this.

6. Development of international law and institutions

We are convinced that international law and international institutions dealing with the prevention and punishment of genocide need constant support from research and expert assessment to improve their effectiveness.

7. The Ukrainian context

Most importantly, the topic of genocide is of particular relevance for Ukraine due to the tragic experience of the Holodomor and the current Russian aggression, which bears signs of genocidal acts [5]. Coverage of these crimes, their scientific understanding and conveying the truth to the international community is extremely important for restoring justice and preventing future crimes.

Thus, in an unstable and interconnected world where the risks of violence and intolerance remain high, the role of the educational and academic fronts in highlighting and combating genocide is not only important, but vital to ensuring peace, justice and human dignity. Their efforts are an investment in a future in which the horrors of genocide will never be repeated.

The study of the legal aspects of the genocide is reflected in the works of a number of scholars, including O. Dermanska, V. Yevdokymov, R. Kaliuzhnyi, I. Prokopenko, V. Tymchyk, H. Chuienko, K. Shymanska, O. Pavliuk, M. Herasymenko, K. Vazhnova, M. Haustova, and others.

The purpose of this study is to conduct a theoretical analysis of the synergy of the educational and scientific fronts in countering genocide.

Of course, the educational and scientific fronts play an extremely important role in highlighting and combating genocide. Their efforts are critical to understanding the causes, mechanisms, and consequences of this horrific crime, as well as to preventing its recurrence. Here are the main aspects of their work in a table for your convenience.

Table 1

Key aspects of the synergy of the educational and scientific fronts in combating genocide

No. s/n	Educational front	Scientific front
1.	Dissemination of knowledge. Educational institutions at all levels (schools, colleges, universities) are key in conveying information about genocides, including the Holodomor, the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, the Rwandan genocide, and other tragedies. This includes the study of history, analysis of primary sources, eyewitness accounts, and research.	Conducting research. Scholars of various disciplines (historians, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, lawyers) conduct in-depth research on the causes, preconditions, processes, and consequences of genocides. Their work reveals the mechanisms of hatred, dehumanization, violence, and state policy that lead to these crimes.
2.	Formation of critical thinking. Education helps pupils and students develop the skills to critically analyze information, distinguish between propaganda and disinformation, and understand the complex socio-political processes that can lead to genocide.	Analysis of international law. Lawyers and experts in international law study the legal aspects of genocide, issues of responsibility, prevention and punishment of perpetrators. Their research contributes to the development of international norms and institutions aimed at combating genocide.

3.	Fostering empathy and tolerance. By learning about the stories of victims and understanding their experiences, education promotes empathy, compassion and respect for diversity. This is an important foundation for building a tolerant society that is resistant to xenophobia and hatred.	Identify patterns and warning signs. Research helps to identify common patterns that lead to genocides, as well as early warning signs and risk factors. This is important for developing effective strategies to prevent future tragedies.
4.	Countering denial and distortion of history. Educational programs based on reliable historical facts are a powerful weapon against attempts to deny or distort the truth about genocides. They help preserve the memory of the victims and the lessons of history.	Publication of scientific papers and participation in conferences. The dissemination of research results through publications in scientific journals and participation in international conferences facilitates the exchange of knowledge between scientists, policy makers, and the public.
5.	Training of teachers. It is important to train teachers and lecturers in the methodology of teaching complex and sensitive topics related to the genocide, taking into account the psychological characteristics of students and pupils.	Cooperation with international organizations and courts. Scholars and often cooperate with international organizations (UN, International Criminal Court) and provide expert support in investigations and trials related to genocide.
6.	Creation of educational resources. The development of high-quality educational materials, textbooks, documentaries, online courses, and interactive platforms contributes to the effective assimilation of knowledge about the genocide.	Development of interdisciplinary approaches. A comprehensive understanding of genocide requires cooperation between representatives of different scientific disciplines, which allows for a more complete and objective picture of this complex phenomenon.
7.	Interaction between the educational and scientific fronts. Close cooperation between educational institutions and research centers is important. Research results should be made available and integrated into educational programs. Scientists can participate in the development of educational materials, give lectures and seminars for teachers and students.	

In conclusion, the synergy of the educational and scientific fronts is indispensable in highlighting the truth about the genocide, fostering critical thinking and tolerance, and developing effective strategies to prevent these horrific crimes in the future. Their work is an important contribution to building a just and humane world.

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## **THE SCIENTIFIC FRONTLINE IN RESISTING THE POLITICS OF GENOCIDE: A CASE STUDY OF MARIUPOL**

Keywords: genocide, human rights, scientific and academic community, Mariupol case, resistance.

The term “genocide” formally recognized in the international law in the aftermath of the Holocaust due to Raphael Lemkin’s passionate advocacy, continues to be in the focus of attention of international community, seeking for the precise scholarly inquiry into its origins, heritages and manifestations as well as the intellectual mechanisms of its resistance. The above-mentioned notion originated from the ancient Greek word ‘genos’ (‘race’, ‘tribe’) and the Latin ‘cide’ (‘killing’), and introduced by the author to denote “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group” (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.) currently shifts its traditional practice in its modern development. Genocide is viewed to indicate a “coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.). Rather than targeting personal attributes, its destructive actions aimed at individuals are fundamentally focused on their belonging to a specific national group.

A diverse array of centers and organizations operating worldwide (e.g., the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Center for Genocide Prevention, Simon-Skjoldt Center Research, the International Crisis, The George and Irina Schaeffer Center for the Study of Genocide, Human Rights and Conflict Prevention at The American University of Paris, Uppsala Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies (UHGS), Holocaust & Genocide Studies Program at the Gladstein Family Human Rights Institute (University of Connecticut), Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention at Binghamton University, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, the Holodomor Research and Education Consortium (HREC), Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies, Tkuma: Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies and others) share their strategic objectives and core mission of robustly opposing all forms of genocide. These entities undertake a wide spectrum of activities, ranging from early warning analysis and impactful policy advocacy to direct intervention protocols and research initiatives aimed at preventing and mitigating the genocidal threats (Bachman, 2022, p. 56). In this regard, the adequate comprehension of the multifaceted motives and devastating consequences of genocide necessitates a deep and consistent scientific analysis with various disciplines implied.

This study proceeds from the premise that education and science – the systematic pursuit of knowledge across the wide spectrum of academic disciplines including humanities, social and natural sciences – establish an indispensable frontline in the ongoing struggle against the emergence of genocidal processes and advance a shared global discourse for the prevention of mass violence worldwide. This issue is particularly relevant in the context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war with the alarming signals of genocide acutely evident during the siege of Mariupol from February 2022. The gravity of these inhuman acts requires both immediate societal response and thorough scientific analysis. For the purpose of this article, we collected empirical evidence and critical perspectives to fully elucidate the complex interplay of factors engendering genocidal ideologies and actions. Furthermore, the study emphasizes the necessity

for the academic community to examine potential avenues for counteracting these manifestations, including the documentation of crimes, the analysis of dehumanization through the detection of factors contributing to violence, and the investigation of its consequences.

In light of the devastating nature of the politics of genocide and the imperative for scientific comprehension, we consider it highly appropriate to introduce Mariupol as a remarkable and compelling case study, particularly considering the city's devastation in February 2022 and its potential for revealing mechanisms of resistance. Acknowledged as Ukraine's "Big Capital of Culture" in 2021, Mariupol held the status of a key outpost of Ukrainian sovereignty and a symbol of "staunch Ukrainian resistance that has thwarted the kremlin's invasion plans" (BBC News, May 12, 2022) since 2014, when Ukrainian forces reclaimed the city following Russia's unsuccessful attempts to occupy it.

Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Mariupol became a priority target for the Kremlin again. This time Russian military offensives aimed to make Mariupol as the example of their brutal and destructive capabilities utilizing tactics that the EU has condemned as "major war crimes". The city was subjected to intense fire and bloodshed, with more than 90% of its infrastructure destroyed, notably the Drama Theater and maternity hospital being bombarded, and the civilians deprived of water, food, electricity, and heating. These bloody scenarios were the vivid illustration of the Kremlin's cynic narrative of "liberating Donbass" by eliminating the Azov battalion, thus "denazifying" Ukraine, giving the Russian-speaking Ukrainians a justification for this invasion. As Ida Sawyer, the director of the Crisis, Conflict and Arms Division at Human Rights Watch, puts it, "Mariupol stands as a testament to the cruel destruction and suffering caused by explosive weapons in cities and towns across the world," adding that "all governments should support justice for crimes committed in Ukraine and sign the international declaration condemning the use of explosive weapons in populated areas"

(Human Rights Watch, 2024). The evidence of a devastating strike on a maternity hospital on March 9th was also recorded: "The attack on the Mariupol maternity hospital raises serious concerns about possible war crimes and the targeting of civilians. This event, widely reported by international news outlets, underscored the vulnerability of the civilian population" (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In addition, Michelle Bachelet, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in her speech on 49th Session of the Human Rights Council, called the community for active actions informing that "in the besieged city of Mariupol, people are living in sheer terror. The situation is worsening by the day, with constant shelling, fighting in the streets and people struggling to survive with the bare minimum of life's necessities including food, water and medical supplies". She testified a rapid rise in civilian casualties by mid-March, asserting that "the actual figures are likely to be considerably higher than those they could verify, hampered by the intense fighting and lack of access to obtain a comprehensive picture (OHCHR, March 15, 2022).

Building upon this framework, this study now draws attention to the specific roles that academic community plays in counteracting the all forms of genocidal policies. In this regard, the case of Mariupol State University provides a truly poignant illustration of both the vulnerability of students and academic staff to the acts of violence and their potential for resilience and resistance. The tragic experiences of the University's community during the siege of Mariupol in February 2022 – enduring the absence of communication, food, water, electricity, heating in sub-zero temperatures, lack of medical aid and functioning pharmacies amidst relentless aerial and artillery bombardment that severed the city from external support – underscore the critical need for scientific inquiry into both the causes and consequences of such atrocities, as well as the role of academic community in preventing them. The University suffered the tragic loss of five members of its academic staff and six students that further highlights the human cost of this violence and the urgency of understanding how education and science can serve as a stronghold against such devastation and its destructive nature. Accordingly, on elaborating on the role of universities in counteracting genocide we make an attempt to distinguish the following aspects:

- 1) recording human rights violations and acts of genocide (collecting the evidence to provide



a comprehensive database, analyze the nature of atrocities using research methodologies); 2) critical investigation of deconstructing ideologies and propaganda (research analysis with various disciplines involved, in particular, sociology, history, arts, psychology, political studies, literature, linguistics, media literacy, etc. to clearly identify the mechanisms and consequences of genocide); 3) the implementation of educational curricula related to the above-mentioned issues (integrating modules/ courses to foster students' critical thinking, a profound sense of tolerance and inclusivity, empathy, human dignity, and a refutation of prejudice, thus enhancing societal resilience against genocidal ideologies); 4) project design and engagement with legal and ethical initiatives (the scholars specializing in the areas of jurisprudence and ethics can contribute to the development of international legal frameworks and ethical guidelines aimed at the prevention of genocide and the enforcement of penalties for this crime); 5) psychological assistance and support (researchers specializing in psychology and related fields provide individual post-trauma assistance to those who suffered from consequences of genocide and mass violence).

The outlined aspects have demonstrated that active and coordinated participation of the scientific community constitutes a key element in countering the politics of genocide and cultivating a more informed and resilient global community. Critical examination of the multifaceted dimensions of genocide, rendered by the tragic Mariupol case study, underscores the dominant and crucial role of universities as intellectual pillars against the vicious manifestation of genocidal politics. Functioning as pivotal hubs of critical inquiry, and centers of historical memory, they bear a deep concern and moral responsibility to actively contest the mechanisms facilitating mass atrocities.

The outlined issues signify critical avenues for further investigation, necessitating sustained scholarly attention across several key aspects. Further research should prioritize interdisciplinary studies using methodologies for evidence collection and inquiry to critically evaluate the impact of ethical and legal frameworks on the prevention and prosecution of genocide.

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## **THE DEPORTATION OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE IN 1944 AS AN ACT OF GENOCIDE: HISTORICAL MEMORY AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION**

Keywords: Crimean Tatars, genocide, deportation, historical memory, cultural identity, international recognition

### **Introduction**

Crimea has always been a pearl of Ukraine, a land of breathtaking beauty and profound historical significance. Like the four elements or four seasons, the Crimean Peninsula is associated with its majestic palaces and gardens, sea, mountains, and rivers. For many Crimean Tatars, Crimea is not just a place on the map but a sacred homeland. The Arabic letter «D» represents the number four, and for Crimean Tatars, it can also symbolize «Domivka» (home). The dance «Haytarma» (from the Crimean Tatar language meaning «return») and the internationally acclaimed song «1944» by Jamala embody the pain and resilience of the Crimean Tatar people. Poetry, music, and cultural traditions offer deep insight into a nation's soul, helping preserve memory and identity.

### **Purpose**

The purpose of this research is to highlight the deportation of the Crimean Tatar people in 1944 as an act of genocide, examine its impact on cultural identity and historical memory, and explore the role of education and international cooperation in preserving and recognizing this tragic event.

### **Results**

The mass deportation of Crimean Tatars on May 18, 1944, orchestrated by the Soviet regime, resulted in the forced displacement of nearly 200,000 people to Central Asia and other remote regions of the USSR. Thousands perished due to starvation, disease, and inhumane conditions. This act aimed not only to erase the Crimean Tatar presence from their homeland but also to destroy their cultural identity.

Despite these efforts, the Crimean Tatar people have preserved their language, traditions, and memory through oral history, literature, and cultural revival. The international recognition of the 1944 deportation as genocide remains a critical goal. The Eurovision-winning song «1944» by Jamala brought global attention to this issue, while dances like «Haytarma» symbolize the ongoing spiritual connection with their native land.

Educational initiatives, including the integration of Crimean Tatar history into academic curricula and public discourse, have strengthened awareness among Ukrainian and international communities. Translation and literary studies play a vital role in sharing this narrative across cultures.

Ukraine has also taken important steps to support the revitalization of the Crimean Tatar language. In 2014, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv opened a specialization in «Crimean Tatar Language and Literature,» providing institutional support for academic study. Media platforms such as the television channels ATR and LALE play a crucial role in broadcasting content in Crimean Tatar. The Crimean House in Kyiv regularly hosts exhibitions, meetings with artists and political leaders, and other cultural events.

Crimean Tatar culture and history have reached wider audiences through works like the film «Haytarma,» directed by Akhtem Seitablaiev, and Jamala's song «1944,» which won the Eurovision Song Contest in 2016. In Ukrainian schools, such as the Novopecherska School in Kyiv, children have the opportunity to study the Crimean Tatar language. The Crimean Tatar diaspora abroad, especially in Eskişehir, Turkey, is actively involved in cultural preservation

through book publishing, conferences, festivals, and language classes.

Additionally, Crimean Tatar language lessons are now available online. A major milestone was the transition of the Crimean Tatar language to a Latin-based script, approved by the Ukrainian government on September 22, 2021. This transition supports the modernization and broader accessibility of the language. In 2024, the inclusion of Crimean Tatar in Google Translate marked another significant achievement. However, further efforts are needed—such as translating animated films and movies into Crimean Tatar—to ensure its continued development and presence in digital and educational spaces.

### Conclusions

The deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944 is widely regarded by scholars and human rights organizations as an act of genocide. Acknowledging and addressing this atrocity is essential to ensuring historical justice, fostering cultural resilience, and preventing future violations of human rights.

### Prospects for Further Research

Further studies should focus on comparative analyses of genocides across different regions, the role of multilingual education in shaping inclusive narratives, and the use of modern digital technologies to preserve the Crimean Tatar cultural heritage. Future interdisciplinary efforts in translation, history, and education can deepen global understanding and contribute to broader recognition of the 1944 deportation as genocide. Additional research on the development and revitalization of the Crimean Tatar language, including its digitalization, education policies, and media presence, will be essential to sustaining this unique cultural identity.

## **CULTURAL GENOCIDE: DESTRUCTION OF UKRAINIAN HERITAGE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND DURING THE ONGOING WAR**

**Keywords:** cultural genocide, Ukrainian heritage, Russian-Ukrainian war, looting, historical memory, restitution, UNESCO.

**Introduction.** Cultural genocide, as a mechanism for erasing Ukrainian national identity, has deep historical roots, traceable to the Russian Empire and Soviet regimes. Systematic looting of cultural treasures, destruction of monuments, and repression of intellectuals were tools of denationalization. In the 21st century, during the Russian-Ukrainian war, these practices have taken new forms: targeted destruction of museums and churches, and widespread looting in occupied territories. Since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, hundreds of cultural heritage sites have been damaged or destroyed, qualifying as war crimes and violations of international law. Russian narratives justifying looting as «salvation» of cultural assets underscore the urgency of analyzing these actions in historical context. This study is driven by the need to document crimes, advocate for restitution, and develop strategies to counter cultural genocide.

This research aims to analyze cultural genocide as a tool of Russian imperial policy in historical perspective and during the ongoing war. Objectives include:

1. tracing historical practices of destroying Ukrainian heritage;
2. assessing the scale of looting and destruction from 2014 to 2025;
3. examining Russian propaganda narratives legitimizing looting;
4. identifying mechanisms to counter these actions through international cooperation and legal frameworks.

In the 18th–19th centuries, the Russian Empire systematically removed Ukrainian cultural treasures to imperial centers. According to historian Hennadii Boryak, artifacts such as Cossack regalia, icons, and archaeological finds were transferred to the Hermitage and other museums, misrepresented as «Russian» [1]. For instance, the archives of the Zaporozhian Sich were confiscated and relocated to St. Petersburg, severing Ukraine's access to its historical records. Libraries, such as those in Kyiv's monasteries, were plundered, with thousands of manuscripts destroyed or repurposed. During the Soviet era, campaigns in the 1920s–1930s led to the confiscation of vast quantities of valuables, including 34 poods of gold and 24,000 poods of silver from Ukrainian churches. These actions were accompanied by the destruction of archives and libraries documenting national history, such as the Central Rada and Hetmanate archives. The «Executed Renaissance» of the 1930s eradicated the intellectual elite preserving cultural memory, further weakening Ukraine's cultural foundation.

Since 2014, and especially after 2022, Russia has intensified attacks on Ukrainian cultural heritage. UNESCO reports that, as of 2024, 345 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including 211 architectural monuments [2]. Estimated damages reach \$3.5 billion. In Mariupol, the Drama Theater, a symbol of genocidal actions, was destroyed, and the Kuindzhi Museum was looted, with original artworks stolen [3]. In Kherson, occupiers removed approximately 10,000 artifacts from the local history museum, as confirmed by occupation official Andrey Malgin [4]. The unique murals of Polina Raiko in Oleshky were 60–70% destroyed due to targeted shelling. In Melitopol, the Museum of Local History was robbed of Scythian gold artifacts, which were later reported in Russian-controlled Crimea [5]. These acts violate international conventions and

contribute to the systematic erasure of Ukrainian identity.

Russian propaganda justifies looting by framing it as «protection» of cultural assets. For instance, Rossiyskaya Gazeta claimed in 2022 that artifacts from Mariupol museums were «saved» from «Ukrainian nationalists» [6]. Similar narratives appear in occupied Crimea's media, where looted Kherson artworks were presented as «exhibits for Russian exhibitions» [7]. Komsomolskaya Pravda described the removal of Kherson artifacts as a «humanitarian mission», ignoring violations of the 1954 Hague Convention [8]. These narratives echo Soviet-era practices, when Ukrainian treasures were appropriated as «All-Union heritage», and aim to legitimize war crimes on the international stage.

The international community recognizes the genocidal nature of attacks on Ukrainian culture. The Council of Europe and UNESCO call for restitution of looted artifacts and stricter sanctions against those involved in looting [9]. UNESCO has initiated a «red list» of endangered Ukrainian cultural artifacts to prevent their sale on the black market, collaborating with Interpol to track illicit trade [2]. Ukraine has established a registry of damaged sites, synchronized with ICOM and Europol data [10, 11]. However, limited access to occupied territories hinders loss assessments, and the trade of stolen artifacts on the black market remains a challenge. Enhanced monitoring of auctions and international legal cooperation are critical steps to ensure accountability and restitution.

Conclusions. Cultural genocide is an integral component of Russian policy against Ukraine, traceable from imperial times to the ongoing war. Historical practices of looting and contemporary looting demonstrate the continuity of denationalization strategies. Russian narratives legitimizing looting amplify the need for counteraction through documentation and international pressure. As a historian, I believe that preserving cultural heritage is not only a scholarly task but also a moral obligation to future generations. Countering cultural genocide requires a multifaceted approach: from verifying damages to prosecuting perpetrators. Cultural heritage remains the foundation of Ukraine's national identity and resilience.

Future research could focus on quantitative analysis of cultural heritage losses by region, particularly in occupied territories. Exploring mechanisms for repatriating looted artifacts through international courts, such as the International Criminal Court, is another promising direction. The impact of cultural genocide on collective memory and national identity formation during wartime warrants further study. Additionally, the role of digital technologies in preserving digitized heritage and creating virtual museums offers potential for mitigating losses. Comparative analyses of cultural genocide in Ukraine with other cases, such as the destruction of heritage in Syria or Iraq, could deepen understanding of global counter-strategies.

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## **ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS WHEN DISCUSSING SENSITIVE TOPICS OF GENOCIDE**

Keywords: genocide, communication, internal communications, ethical communication, institutional responsibility, war in Ukraine

In an era marked by armed conflicts, historical traumas, and global attention to human rights, the ethical handling of sensitive issues such as genocide in internal institutional communication has become imperative. Military, governmental, and educational institutions increasingly face the challenge of presenting the history of genocide with both factual accuracy and moral sensitivity.

Discussions of genocidal violence – such as the Holocaust, the Holodomor, or the Rwandan genocide – require ethical frameworks that ensure respect for victims, historical truth, and emotional safety for those involved in the communication process. In this context, internal communications are not merely administrative exchanges of information; they serve as platforms for education, remembrance, institutional integrity, and moral responsibility.

As Hannah Arendt argued in Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), only through clear and ethically responsible discourse can institutions reconcile with the legacy of mass violence [1]. Similarly, Susan Sontag (2003) warned against the desensitization and instrumentalization of trauma in public dialogue [2]. Ethical communication frameworks—especially in internal environments – are necessary to prevent distortions and preserve institutional integrity.

Moreover, S.M. Weine's (2006) research on trauma narratives confirms that ethical representation of traumatic histories fosters psychological resilience and historical accountability [3]. Likewise, S.J.A. Ward in his work *Ethics and the Media* (2011) emphasized that communication ethics extend beyond journalism and apply equally to internal and institutional dialogues, especially in emotionally and politically sensitive contexts [4].

In military and educational institutions, especially in post-totalitarian or conflict-affected societies, the importance of ethically literate internal communication is amplified. Institutions like Yad Vashem and UNESCO provide frameworks for discussing genocide in respectful, historically grounded ways. The absence of such ethical foundations risks fact distortion, retraumatization of victims and their descendants, and the erosion of trust in institutions [5–7].

This relevance has become even more urgent due to the war crimes and documented acts of genocide committed by Russian forces against the Ukrainian people after February 24, 2022. The mass killings of civilians, deportations, targeted attacks on cultural identity, and deliberate destruction of infrastructure constitute not only a humanitarian crisis but also a moral test for institutional response in Ukraine and beyond. In light of the current situation, the scholarly work of D. Azarov et al. (2023) is especially significant, as it provides a detailed analysis of the intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation – through mass civilian killings, child deportations, and the public rhetoric of Russian state officials [8]. These actions meet the definition of genocide under the 1948 UN Convention.

Ukraine's government, civil society, and military institutions now face an urgent need to respond to these atrocities in an ethically grounded and internally cohesive way. Developing sensitive yet principled approaches to internal communication is vital for morale, resilience, and national unity.

The aim of this study is to analyze the ethical aspects of internal communications in the context of genocide-related discourse and to develop practical recommendations for institutional

application.

Discussing genocide is always a journey through pain, trauma, and complex historical narratives. Internal communications in organizations engaged in research, education, or commemoration of genocide victims play a crucial role in fostering understanding, supporting staff, and preserving the dignity of the affected. However, this vital function is closely tied to a set of ethical challenges that require special attention and a responsible approach. The study explores the key ethical challenges associated with genocide coverage.

Secondary traumatization – careless or unconsidered discussion of genocide may trigger renewed psychological trauma in individuals with personal or family histories tied to such tragedies. Particularly vulnerable are staff members with experiences of military service, forced displacement, or the loss of loved ones. This retraumatization may manifest as flashbacks, anxiety, irritability, or emotional burnout. Internal communication must account for the need for psycho-emotional safety by modeling responsible language, acknowledging the complexity of the topic, and providing opportunities for emotional decompression.

Hate speech and insensitive expressions – the use of stereotypes, euphemisms, or inappropriate phrasing can demean the memory of victims and harm colleagues morally. For example, depersonalizing a tragedy or reducing complex events to vague generalizations («it was a long time ago», «it happened to everyone») minimizes the scale of the crime. Unethical language may subtly normalize violence and devalue suffering. It is crucial to develop an institutional standard for sensitive and ethical language, including mandatory checks for phrasing sensitivity to the audience and historical-cultural context.

Institutional responsibility – organizations that fail to ensure an ethical framework for genocide discussions risk losing trust both internally and externally. The absence of a clear policy on communicating complex topics threatens to deepen employees' emotional isolation and erode the institution's credibility. Neglecting this aspect may lead to workplace conflicts, traumatic incidents, or even legal consequences in cases of offensive or misleading statements. Ethical policy must include training programs, consultations with ethics and psychology experts, and procedures for responding to complaints.

Thus, genocide discussion within internal communications of institutions involved in its research, education, or memorialization is not merely a matter of information transmission. It is a delicate process that deeply affects human emotions, historical memory, and collective consciousness. For this reason, expanding the understanding of ethical aspects in such communication requires careful analysis of each challenge, integration of humanistic principles into institutional communication policy, and the cultivation of a long-term culture of responsible dialogue.

Respect and dignity in multiple dimensions: This principle includes not only respectful treatment of victims but also of survivors, their descendants, and the staff members working with this traumatic material. Internal communication must consider the diversity of experiences and interpretations, avoiding oversimplification or generalization of the tragedy. Attention must be paid to cultural, religious, and personal contexts that may affect perceptions of genocide. Language use must be careful and avoid terms that could stigmatize or offend certain groups. Visual materials require particular sensitivity to avoid exploiting suffering for sensationalism, instead serving the purpose of documentation and commemoration.

Psychological safety as a multifaceted responsibility: Ensuring psychological safety goes beyond merely informing about the availability of support services. It involves creating a culture of openness and mutual support, where staff feel comfortable expressing emotions and experiences related to the topic of genocide. Internal communications must be sensitive to potential triggers and avoid overly graphic details without appropriate context and preparation. Training for leaders and communicators in trauma-informed approaches is essential to properly respond to emotional reactions. Consideration should also be given to the mental health impact on broader staff, not just those directly involved in genocide-related work.

Transparency and honesty as foundations of trust: In the context of genocide, where



many politicized narratives and denial attempts exist, transparency and honesty in internal communication are of particular importance. This requires not only providing accurate information but also openly acknowledging the complexity and controversy of some historical aspects. Critical thinking and the ability to distinguish facts from interpretations should be encouraged. Transparency also includes openness about research methodology, sources, and potential biases. Internal communication should be a platform for honest discussions based on evidence rather than political or ideological convictions.

**Confidentiality and protection of personal data in sensitive contexts:** When internal communications involve personal stories of genocide survivors or witnesses, confidentiality becomes paramount. Clear boundaries of privacy must be established, and informed consent must be obtained before sharing any personal information. Anonymity and protection from retraumatization should be prioritized. This also applies to protecting the personal data of staff members who may share emotional reactions or personal experiences related to genocide.

**Inclusivity and representation of diverse voices for holistic understanding:** Genocide rarely has a single narrative. It affects different groups, each with their own experiences and memories. Internal communication should actively promote the inclusion of these diverse voices by providing platforms for their expression. This may include involving representatives of different affected groups in internal discussions, using diverse communication formats that meet various needs, and consciously avoiding the dominance of a single perspective. Inclusivity also means recognizing the complexity of intergroup relations and avoiding simplified or stereotypical portrayals.

**Accountability for the consequences of communication as an ongoing process:** Awareness of the potential impact of internal communications on genocide perception is a key ethical aspect. Organizations must not only carefully craft their messages but also be prepared to monitor and analyze their effects. This involves openness to feedback from staff and readiness to adjust communication strategies as needed. Accountability also includes proactive resistance to misinformation and the distortion of genocide-related facts in the institution's internal information space. It's important to remember that internal communications can influence not only employees but also external perceptions of the organization and its mission.

An expanded understanding of the ethical aspects of internal communications when discussing sensitive topics like genocide requires ongoing self-reflection, open dialogue, and a willingness to learn. This complex yet vitally important process contributes not only to more effective institutional work but also to a deeper understanding of genocide and the strengthening of humanistic values. The ethical labyrinth of internal communications demands a careful guide—one guided by the principles of respect, safety, transparency, inclusivity, and accountability—to ensure proper commemoration of victims and help prevent similar atrocities in the future.

Discussing genocide within internal communication systems is more than an administrative or educational challenge—it is an ethical imperative. Institutions, especially those engaged in national defense, governance, and education, bear the responsibility not only to preserve historical truth but also to model a respectful, trauma-informed, and morally grounded discourse. By integrating ethical principles and reflective practices, such communication can contribute to healing, institutional resilience, and the prevention of future atrocities. Ethical engagement with genocidal violence—especially in the context of Ukraine's struggle following the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022—requires honesty, empathy, and clarity. Internal communications must serve not only to inform but also to affirm dignity and unity in the face of existential threats.

To avoid secondary traumatization, the trivialization of tragedy, and the erosion of trust, organizations must implement a systemic approach to communications that address the topic of genocide. First and foremost, clear internal protocols should be established, grounded in international human rights standards. Such an approach not only reduces the risk of emotional harm but also strengthens the institution's reputation as a humanistically oriented body.

It is crucial to provide training for personnel—particularly those responsible for communication—through facilitated dialogues, trauma-informed training sessions, and ethical behavior modeling. These initiatives help deepen understanding of how to speak about difficult issues in a way that is

respectful, sensitive, and non-harmful.

Interdisciplinary collaboration also proves effective. Historians, psychologists, educators, and legal experts can provide essential support in crafting internal messages, commemorative events, or informational materials related to genocide. Their involvement helps avoid missteps while enriching the meaning and depth of communications.

Creating an environment where staff members are not afraid to ask difficult questions, discuss ethical dilemmas, and learn from mistakes is vital. Institutions should encourage open reflection, accountability, and mutual respect in their internal discourse.

Equally important is the use of diverse formats – written, visual, and verbal. This ensures that the information is more accessible and that complex topics are presented in ways that account for individual and professional differences in perception.

The ethical aspects of internal communication when addressing the topic of genocide represent a complex but essential task for modern institutions. Such communication can never be neutral or purely technical – it inherently involves a profound moral dimension, encompassing the dignity of victims, the psycho-emotional well-being of staff, and the reputation of the institution. In light of current events, particularly the genocidal practices documented in Ukraine since February 24, 2022, this issue gains urgent relevance. The implementation of ethical protocols, interdisciplinary cooperation, and facilitated dialogues must become the foundation for a safe and responsible communicative environment. Ethical communication in times of trauma not only prevents secondary harm but also creates space for collective reflection, solidarity, and trust.

An ethical conversation about genocide is not only about the past—it is also about shaping our shared future.

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## **ECOCIDE AS A COMPONENT OF GENOCIDE – CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY**

**Keywords:** ecocide, martial law, crimes against environmental security, military aggression, pollution.

Relevance of the topic. In the 21st century, the issue of environmental security has ceased to be merely a matter of environmental policy. The mass and systematic destruction of the natural environment—ecocide—is increasingly being viewed not only as a crime against nature, but also, we may argue, as an instrument of genocide, causing multidimensional catastrophic consequences for the lives of entire nations. The term «ecocide» was first used in the 1970s to describe the large-scale destruction of nature during the Vietnam War. Today, ecocide is being proposed as the fifth international crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, alongside genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression.

In the context of the full-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the destruction of dams, pollution of water bodies, annihilation of nature reserves and forest fires, active hostilities, and the mining of large areas are increasingly becoming deliberate actions targeting ecosystems. These also affect public health, welfare, cultural heritage, and even national identity. They consciously create conditions unfit for life, which correspond to specific elements of genocide defined in international law.

This publication is devoted to analyzing the legal nature of ecocide, its close connection to genocide, and outlining the key environmental and social consequences that such aggression entails.

The actions of the Russian Federation during the full-scale invasion have resulted in large-scale destruction not only of infrastructure but also of ecosystems. Ecocide refers to the mass destruction of flora or fauna, the poisoning of the atmosphere or water bodies, as well as other actions that may lead to an environmental disaster [1]. This concept became widely used in the 1970s and is now recognized as a criminal offense not only in Ukrainian legislation but also internationally. According to Article 441 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, ecocide—defined as the mass destruction of flora or fauna, poisoning of the atmosphere or water resources, or other actions capable of causing an environmental catastrophe—is punishable by imprisonment for 8 to 15 years [2].

As of April 2025, due to the Russian Federation's military aggression, active hostilities continue in large parts of Ukraine. According to the updated list of territories approved by the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine (Order No. 376 dated February 28, 2025), areas in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv regions are recognized as active combat zones [3].

Ecocide has a wide-ranging negative impact not only on ecosystems but also on almost all areas of human activity. Destruction, pollution, or deliberate devastation of natural resources, soils, and forests fundamentally alter the conditions of human existence in the long term. In our view, the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine is a deliberate and targeted manifestation of ecocide.

More and more scholars are focusing on the issue of ecocide. In particular, I.V. Kiryeyeva explores the problem of liability for ecological damage caused by a terrorist state's military aggression. L.P. Dzundza analyzes ecocide as a crime against humanity in the context of the war against Ukraine. Other Ukrainian researchers also pay close attention to this issue, including V.O.

Ukolova, Ye.O. Ukolova, V.K. Rybachek, and T. Sadova.

The most severe form of ecocide is war-related ecocide, as it serves solely to achieve military and political goals and significantly undermines the value of nature and both human and animal life [4].

The war in Ukraine, which began in 2014, marked the beginning of a new wave of crimes against the environment. Its consequences will be felt for many years and will have a profoundly negative impact on future generations. Not only front-line regions are affected, but also rear areas. For example, in regions where hostilities did not occur directly, the most affected are Dnipropetrovsk (37 recorded eco-crimes), Odesa (27), Lviv (17), Ivano-Frankivsk and Vinnytsia (15 each) [5].

The greatest environmental damage from hostilities is associated with the pollution of the atmosphere, lithosphere, and hydrosphere. Explosions often hit storage facilities for petroleum products, gas, and other toxic substances. Areas of military equipment concentration and fuel storage cause substantial environmental stress. Warfare drastically reduces the numbers of flora and fauna, especially endangered species.

For example, during a missile strike, a rocket hit the Yuriev Institute of Plant Production in Kharkiv, destroying the only seed bank of its kind in Ukraine and one of the largest in Europe, which held over 160,000 samples collected over many years from all over the world. Most of this collection cannot be restored due to the loss of unique species that are now extinct [6].

During the shelling of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Station, storage tanks for fuel and lubricants were damaged, releasing approximately 150 tons of oil into the environment, with a threat of another 300 tons leaking. The resulting film on the water's surface has a devastating impact on aquatic life in rivers and the Black Sea [7, 8].

The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Station is already considered the largest technological disaster on the planet since the Chernobyl nuclear explosion. Besides immediate environmental consequences, long-term effects include falling river water levels, risks to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, the disruption of agriculture in Mykolaiv and Kherson regions, desertification of vast territories, and the loss of freshwater access in Crimea [8].

In conclusion, the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine causes not only human and economic losses but also long-lasting environmental damage. Warfare brings widespread pollution and the destruction of ecosystems, which in turn leads to colossal economic losses. As of 2025, the World Bank estimates these losses at approximately \$17.33 billion, with \$7.37 billion already allocated by Ukraine's government and international donors. However, there remains a funding gap of \$9.96 billion [9].

Therefore, ecocide—as part of genocide—must be seriously addressed not only in Ukrainian legislation but also in international law, since Russia's aggression harms not only Ukraine's ecosystem but also those of Europe as a whole.

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